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The New Uniform Statute of Limitations
for Federal Securities Fraud Actions: Its




As with most things in this world, timing is everything. So too in
the law, where even the nascent law student becomes quickly ac-
quainted with the matter of statutes of limitation.' Critical to the
maintenance of any legal action, the resolution of the question of a
lawsuit's timeliness either breathes life into the litigation or summa-
rily terminates it for all time.
Very recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed this
venerable issue in the realm of the comparatively youthful laws of
securities regulation. In the context of the routinely tumultuous
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St. John's University College of Business Administration (B.S. 1980). He was formerly
Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable D. Joseph DeVito, United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Distxict of New Jersey. Admitted to practice in the states of New York
and Pennsylvania, Mr. Sabino is presently associated with the New York City law firm
of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae. He is also an adjunct Professor of Law, St.
John's University College of Business Administration.
The author dedicates this writing to Michael A. James, with deepest thanks for pro-
viding the inspiration for this article.
1. See BLAcic's LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979), where a statute of limitations is
defined as:
A statute prescribing limitations to the right of action on certain described
causes of action or criminal prosecutions; that is, declaring that no suit shall
be maintained on such causes of action, nor any criminal charge be made, un-
less brought within a specified period of time after the right accrued. Statutes
of limitation Ewe statutes of repose, and are such legislative enactments as pre-
scribe the periods within which actions may be brought upon certain claims or
within which certain rights may be enforced. In criminal cases, however, a
statute of limitation is an act of grace, a surrendering by sovereign of its right
to prosecute.
Id. at 835.
arena of securities fraud litigation, the high Court pronounced for the
first time that actions complaining of fraudulent activity in the stock
market would be time-barred unless commenced either within one
year from the date of the discovery of the fraud or three years from
the operative date of the alleged fraud itself.2
By declaring this uniform one-year/three-year limitary period, the
Justices broke with a practice nearly four-decades old of "borrowing"
from analogous state statutes of limitation by the federal courts, a
practice that led to disparate results, given the diversity in state stat-
utes of repose. Indeed, this break with the traditional view was by no
means a clean one.3 By itself, that very fact was sufficient to raise
eyebrows in the securities bar.
Moreover, this decision on the timeliness of securities fraud ac-
tions seems to suffer itself from poor timing. It comes not long after
the insider trading scandals of the late 1980s forced Congress to re-
vamp the sanctions for such wrongful acts, wherein legislators not
only cracked down on that particularly insidious variety of stock
fraud, but provided for a statute of limitations far more liberal than
the one just enunciated by the Court. This decision followed by mere
months the congressional enactment of a "catch-all" limitary period
of four years for federal actions lacking specific periods of repose. In
effect, this again grants a larger window of opportunity before the
federal bench for everyone except those alleging securities fraud.
There is little wonder that this holding has incited further debate,
and inspired proposals for remedial legislation.
The purpose of this article is to initially overview the antifraud sec-
tion of the federal securities code at the heart of this debate, then ex-
plore some of the basic tenets that underlie the practice of borrowing
state limitary periods where no congressionally enacted statute of
limitations exists for a federal cause of action. This will be followed
by an overview of the paramount circuit court decisions which pre-
ceded this limitary innovation, primarily the recent decision of the
"mother court" of the federal securities law, a decision which ren-
dered the high Court's opinion almost anti-climactic. Next, an analy-
sis of the foregoing shall, among other things, contrast the newly
minted limitation period for securities fraud with the aforementioned
limitations of recent vintage, in light of the strong competing inter-
ests engaged in mortal combat over the desirability of this particular
period, concluding thereupon with a note for potential legislative
revision.
2. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis and Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S.Ct. 2773
(1991).
3. Notably, the syllabus took a full paragraph of nearly 100 words simply to cata-
log which Justice joined in or dissented from which part of the opinion.
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This will be followed by an examination of the apparent retroac-
tive application to be given to the new uniform one-year/three-year
limitation period, contrasted with the teachings of the Supreme
Court that strongly favor only prospective application only for such
breaks from precedent. The disharmony evident within the high
Court on this crucial issue is exposed, and analyzed with a view to-
wards its future resolution. This writing then concludes by discuss-
ing legislation., now pending before Congress, aimed at revising the
uniform one-year/three-year rule to a construct the lawmakers con-
sider more appropriate for securities antifraud litigation.
THE ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
REGULATIONS-A "BASIC" REVIEW
Before conmmencing the journey in search of the correct limitary
period for securities antifraud litigation, some elemental points are
worthy of perusal. The quintessential statute underlying these pro-
ceedings is section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which declares:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
4
As indicated, section 10(b) authorizes the Securities and Exchange
Commission to promulgate rules and regulations to enforce the stat-
ute. The relevant rule, universally known as Rule 10b-5, is an ex-
tended version of the prohibitions enacted in title 15, and is used both
in conjunction and interchangeably with the statutory provision.5
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
5. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make amy untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the
purchase of any security.
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1991).
By enacting section 10(b), "Congress meant to prohibit the full
range of ingenious devices that might be used" to perpetrate securi-
ties fraud.6 To ensure that this protective device would be of maxi-
mum benefit to the investing public that it is ultimately intended to
protect, the existence of an implied private right of action for dam-
ages pursuant to section 10(b) "has been consistently recognized for
more than [at that time] 35 years" and "is simply beyond
peradventure."7
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson8, the Supreme Court began its most re-
cent decision on this important subject by outlining the pertinent an-
tifraud regulations and their legislative history. Writing for the
Court, Justice Blackmun opined that Rule 10b-5 was designed to pro-
tect investors from manipulative devices and frauds foisted upon the
stock exchanges by unscrupulous parties.9 To facilitate that vital
task, a private cause of action grounded in section 10(b) has been im-
plied by the federal courts.10
And as noted in Justice White's partial dissent in Basic, this action
is grounded in the "common law doctrines of fraud and deceit."11
For even where the court has extended civil liability under section
10(b) beyond the boundaries contemplated by the common law, "we
have retained familiar legal principles as our guideposts."12 More-
over, the learned Justice also pointed out that, by reason of the
"scant legislative history" of section 10(b), the Court in the past has
had to examine Congress' intent when "endeavor[ing] to discern the
limits of private causes of action" under the antifraud statute.13
As this abridged history amply demonstrates, section 10(b) was
designed with the intent to cut a wide swath through all manner of
insidious devices that might be used to perpetrate fraud upon the se-
curities marketplace. Ground in timeless principles of fraud and de-
ceit, the antifraud statute has kept those common law traditions as
guideposts, while still ranging far beyond their historical boundaries.
To be sure, the private cause of action implicitly arising from sec-
tion 10(b) has long been recognized by the courts. However, as is
nearly always the case with rights that arise by implication, the un-
derlying statute is bereft of a legislatively enacted statute of limita-
6. Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977).
7. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 373, 389 (1983).
8. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
9. Id. at 230-31.
10. Id. at 231. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196, reh'g denied,
425 U.S. 986 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); 6
Loss, Securities Regulation 3869-73 (1969); 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1763 (2d ed.
1961); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
11. Basic, 485 U.S. at 253 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
12. Id. at 253.
13. Id. at 257.
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tions. Just as the courts struggling to overcome this troublesome gap
in the regulatory scheme have done, we now turn to the Supreme
Court's teachings on the "borrowing" of appropriate limitary periods
for federal statutes lacking that vital attribute.
THE "BORROWING" OF STATE STATUTES OF LIMITATION-THE
SUPREME COURT'S PARAMETERS
It has long been the strong direction of the Supreme Court that
"'[flew areas of the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, eas-
ily applied rules than does the subject of periods of limitations.' "'14
This objective is not served by an approach whereby the limitations
period for each federal claim would "depend upon the particular facts
or the precise legal theory of each claim."15 A factual, claim-based
approach to characterizing a case for limitations purposes would not
promote "[t]he federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the
minimization of unnecessary litigation." 16
It is the usual rule that when Congress has failed to provide a stat-
ute of limitations for a federal cause of action, a court "borrows" or
"absorbs" the local time limitation most analogous to the case at
hand.17 This practice, derived from the Rules of Decision Act' 8 , has
enjoyed sufficient longevity that it is assumed that, in enacting reme-
dial legislation, Congress ordinarily "intends by its silence that we
borrow state law."19
The rule, however, is not without exception. The Supreme Court
has recognized that a state legislature rarely enacts a limitations pe-
riod with federal interests in mind,20 and when the operation of a
state limitations period would frustrate the policies embraced by the
federal enactment, the Court has looked to federal law for a suitable
period.21 These departures from the state borrowing doctrine have
been motivated by the high Court's conclusion that it would be "inap-
propriate to conclude that Congress would choose to adopt state rules
14. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985) ("Wilson"), quoting Chardon v.
Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 274.
16. Id. at 275.
17. Id. at 266-67.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
19. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147
(1987).
20. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
21. See DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158
(1983).
at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law." 22
Primacy must be given to the federal policies at stake, in order "to
assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere
with the implementation of national policies." 23
In modern times, the linchpin of the Supreme Court's teachings on
the "borrowing" of state statutes of limitation can be found in
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters.24 Lacking an
express federal statute of limitations for the labor-related cause of ac-
tion before it, the seven-two majority set forth its thesis on the sub-
ject as follows:
In such situations we do not ordinarily assume that Congress intended that
there be no time limit on actions at all; rather, our task is to "borrow" the
most suitable statute or other rule of timeliness from some other source. We
have generally concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the
most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law.
2 5
Indeed, Justice Brennan added in a footnote that this "fallback rule
of thumb .... rests on the assumption that, absent some sound rea-
son to do otherwise, Congress would likely intend that the courts fol-
low their previous practice of borrowing state provisions."26
Yet, notwithstanding the force of this proposition, the Court held
that where a state limitary period would be an unsatisfactory vehicle
for enforcing a federal statute, "it may be inappropriate to conclude
that Congress would choose to adopt state rules at odds with the pur-
pose or operation of federal substantive law."27 The Court found that
neither the Erie doctrine28 nor the Rules of Decision Act29 estab-
lishes "a mandatory rule that we apply state law in federal
interstices." 30
Rejecting the argument that the Rules of Decision Act mandates
the application of state periods of repose, Justice Brennan found that
argument begged the question. "Tihe choice of a limitations period
for a federal cause of action is itself a question of federal law."31
Should the policies of the underlying action demand a limitary period
be drawn from the federal schema, then the Rules of Decision Act is
inapplicable by its own prerequisite that state law can only be applied
if the federal provision does not otherwise require or provide.32
"[N]o decision of this Court... requires borrowing state law to fill
22. Id. at 161.
23. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of CaL 432 U.S. at 367.
24. 462. U.S. 151 (1983).
25. Id. at 158.
26. Id. at 158-59 n.12.
27. Id. at 161.
28. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
30. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161 n.13.
31. Id.
32. Id at 159 n.13.
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gaps in federal substantive statutes," declared Justice Brennan, con-
tending further that the Court does so "as a matter of interstitial
fashioning of remedial details under the respective substantive fed-
eral statutes.".3
Having established the alternatives available to it under the "bor-
rowing" doctrine, the Court rationalized its preference to apply a fed-
eral statute of limitations in the instant case by citing the availability
of a federal limitary period "actually designed to accommodate a bal-
ance of interests very similar to that at stake here - a statute that is,
in fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit more apt than any of the
suggested state-law parallels."34
Notwithstanding that choice, the high bench struck this cautionary
note:
We stress that our holding today should not be taken as a departure from
prior practice in borrowing limitations periods for federal causes of action ....
We do not mean to suggest that federal courts should eschew use of state limi-
tations periods anytime state law fails to provide a perfect analogy. On the
contrary, as the courts have often discovered, there is not always an obvious
state-law choice for application to a given federal cause of action; yet resort to
state law remAins the norm for borrowing of limitations periods.
3 5
Reconciling the foregoing caveat to its instant choice of federal law,
the Court held that "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law
clearly provides a closer analogy then available state statutes, and
when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation
make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for intersti-
tial lawmaking," the federal laws of repose must step ahead of state
statutes of limitation.36 To be sure, this credo was the benchmark es-
tablished by the Supreme Court.
While clearly outnumbered, the dissenters did make brief, but nev-
ertheless telling, points. Justice Stevens noted that the "borrowing"
doctrine has held sway for the past century, not because it was
merely an appropriate form of interstitial law making, but rather be-
cause it was mandated by Congress via the Rules of Decision Act.37
"Congress," declared Justice Stevens, "has given us no reason to de-
33. 1& at 160 n.13. Such "interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of
the federal courts." United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593
(1973).
34. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169.
35. Id. at 151.
36. 1i at 171.
37. Id. at 172-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Stevens quoted the
original enactment, § 34, Judiciary Act of 1789, Rev. Stat. § 721, 1 Stat. 92 (1789), exem-
plifying that it remains virtually unchanged in today's codification. Id, at 173 n.1.
part from our settled practice .... ,,s8 In her separate dissent, Justice
O'Connor also found that borrowing from state law, given both its
longevity as the norm and a congressional awareness thereof, means
that "in the absence of strong indications to the contrary, that Con-
gress intends by its silence that we follow the usual rule."39
In DelCostello, we then have the Supreme Court validating the
"borrowing" doctrine as to the application of state limitary periods to
federal causes of action, while simultaneously establishing an option
for the federal bench to bypass that practice and look to federal law
for borrowing purposes, if the forum's provisions prove to be inade-
quate. Just over four years later, DelCostello would provide much of
the foundation for the second, key modern ruling on the "borrowing"
doctrine.
In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.,40 the
Supreme Court decided to establish a uniform statute of limitations
for federal civil RICO actions. In the Court's view the most appropri-
ate source for this particular borrowing exercise was the federal anti-
trust laws. Justice O'Connor, speaking for the majority, delivered
the opinion of the Court in a virtually unanimous decision.41
While citing to Delcostello extensively,42 the Court did vary the sit-
uation before it somewhat, stating that "the mere fact that state law
fails to provide a perfect analogy ... is never itself sufficient" to re-
ject the forum's limitation period for that of the federal scheme.43
However, harking back to the alternative pathways created by
DelCostello,44 the court affirmed that it is correct to borrow from the
federal law, and not the state provisions, where the former statutes
provide a closer analogy, and federal policies and the practicalities of
litigation are thereby better served.45
38. Id, at 174.
39. Id. at 174 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
40. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
41. Id. at 144. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and filed a separate
opinion.
42. See id. at 146-48.
43. Id. at 147.
44. Id. at 146 (citing to DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462
U.S. 151 (1983)).
45. Id. at 147-48. See also Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355
(1977) (adopting federal statute of limitations for Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission enforcement proceedings); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357
U.S. 221 (1958) (same for unseaworthiness action under general admiralty law); Holm-
berg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946) (refusing to adopt state limitations period for
federally created equity action). Compare Justice Scalia's theory that there be no pe-
riod of limitation at all where state law does not offer up an appropriate limitary span.
"Such an approach would promote uniformity as effectively as the borrowing of a fed-
eral statute, and would do a better job of avoiding litigation over limitations issues ....
Indeed, it might even prompt Congress to enact a limitations period that it believes
'appropriate,' a judgment far more within its competence than ours." Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 170 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Apparently in the Court's foremost concerns were the federal poli-
cies and litigation practicalities at stake in RICO actions such as this
one. Since RICO cases "commonly involve interstate transactions,"
thereby implicating the statutes of limitations of several states, the
Court expressed concern for forum shopping and the resultant com-
plications from litigation over what should be a direct matter.46 In
their calculus, the Justices held that the courts should accord particu-
lar weight to the geographic character of a claim in deciding whether
a federal or state statute of limitations should be used:
The multistate nature of (the federal cause of action at issue) indicates the de-
sirability of a uniform federal statue of limitations. With the possibility of a
multiple state limitations, the use of state statutes would present the danger
of forum shopping and, at the very least, would 'virtually guarante[e] ... com-
plex and expensive litigation over what should be a straightforward matter.
Moreover, application of uniform federal limitations period (for RICO) avoids
the application of unduly short state statutes of limitations that would thwart
the legislative purpose of creating effective remedy.47
To be sure, the Court admitted that in borrowing from the anti-
trust laws for a statute of repose, it was rejecting the five-year statute
of limitations legislated for criminal RICO actions. Dismissing this as
the "catch all" limitary period for federal crimes,48 the high bench
more importantly held that the five-year limitation "does not reflect
any congressional balancing of the competing equities unique to civil
RICO actions or, indeed, any other federal civil remedy."49
We have then here the basic wisdom of the Supreme Court, es-
pousing a doctrine of borrowing from state law to fill the abhorrent
vacuum left in the federal schema when Congress fails to enact a cor-
responding statute of limitations for a substantive law. To be sure,
the more recent decisions of the high Court indicate that the borrow-
ing principle is not unyielding, especially where a closer fit may be
obtained from the federal codes, as opposed to the forum's limitary
provisions.
The aforenoted lack of a statute of repose for section 10(b) placed
that provision squarely under the purview of the borrowing method-
ology provided by the high Court. And, as we shall see, it was the
slow and steady liberalization of the state borrowing doctrine that
provided the catalyst for the modern revolution in limiting the time
for securities antifraud actions.
46. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 153.
47. Id. at 154, quoting Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Sec-
tion of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 392 (1985).
48. Id. at 155. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988).
49. Id. at 156.
THE CIRCUIT CASES
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent landmark decision, on the
whole, the federal circuit courts of appeals' decisions regarding the
appropriate limitary periods for antifraud actions were more or less
evenly split between state limitation periods governing common law
fraud,50 the statute of limitations for state "blue-sky" securities law
violations,51 and those establishing a uniform federal period of
limitation.52
It was left for today's Supreme Court to exercise the final option,
and declare section 10(b) to be controlled by a uniform period of limi-
tation. Obviously, the Court's decision was necessitated by the con-
troversy among the circuits on this critical matter, and the
promulgation of the new rule by the highest Court in the land is
deeply rooted in the erudite opinions of the circuit courts which
boldly preceded the Justices' venture into this uncharted territory.
For these reasons, we shall commence by examining the appellate
groundswell advocating a uniform rule on the proper limitary period
for securities antifraud lawsuits.
LEADING THE WAY-THE THIRD CIRCUIT AND DATA ACCESS
"Follow me" is the well-publicized motto of the United States
Army's Ranger battalions, typically deployed to lead the way into
combat for regular units. In the warfare of federal securities litiga-
tion, it was the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that "took the
point" in the battle for a uniform federal statute of limitations for an-
tifraud cases. In so doing, that tribunal made the breakthrough that
would lead to today's new rules of engagement.
From the outset, the court's decision in In re Data Access Systems
Securities Litigation53 attained greater significance because the
Third Circuit assembled en banc, thus enabling it to "make this re-
examination freely and without constraint of panel precedents." 54
The case itself was a certified class action lawsuit, brought by inves-
tors alleging violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by various en-
tities, including the lawyers and accountants involved in the
50. Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1990); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines
and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990).
51. O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 18 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1124
(1981); Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1977); See also Alton v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 753 F. Supp. 39, 41 (D. Mass. 1990) (Mazzone, J.) (citing
First Circuit cases).
52. In re Data Access Systems Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (en banc),
cert. denied, Vitiello v. I. Kahlowski & Co., 488 U.S. 849 (1988); Short v. Belleville Shoe
Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991); Ceres Part-
ners v. GEL Assoc., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
53. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1537.
54. Id at 1538.
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underlying stock offering. The court below had determined it should
borrow the New Jersey six-year statue of limitations for common law
fraud as the proper yardstick for measuring the timeliness of the
action.55
Recognizing the lack of Supreme Court guidance on an appropriate
limitary period for antifraud lawsuits, and the attendant confusion
thereby created, the court harked back to its own precedents on this
troublesome issue.56 Previously, the Third Circuit had deferred to
the forum state's common law policy of repose on this point,5 7 but
not without acknowledging the difficulties with utilizing a so-called
exact-match approach.58 However, a reconnaissance of "the teach-
ings contained in recent relevant Supreme Court opinions"5 9 led the
tribunal to conclude that it was now compelled to adopt but one
statue of limitations for section 10(b) claims.60
In looking for that most appropriate limitary period, the Third Cir-
cuit first declared it would be erroneous to equate private causes of
action under the securities antifraud laws with common law fraud ac-
tions.61 While the Court stated that section 10(b) does not impose the
clear and convincing standard of evidence traditional to state com-
mon law fraud, said the court, the federal schema is nevertheless
designed to establish tighter standards of conduct in the securities in-
dustry.62 Nonetheless, the Third Circuit cautioned it was bound to
proceed on the assumption that Congress intended to borrow from
state law; only if such provisions were inadequate for the task at
hand would a period of repose be drawn from an analogous federal
provision.63 Apparently, the court found the state provisions "an un-
satisfactory vehicle for the enforcement of this type of federal securi-
ties law," as it concluded the limitary periods expressly set forth in
the Securities 'Exchange Act of 1934 made for a closer fit for a statute
of limitations for section 10(b).64
55. Id. at 153&39.
56. Id. at 1539-40.
57. Id. at 1540-41, discussing Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir.
1979), and Biggarum v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980).
58. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1541, quoting Roberts, 611 F.2d at 612 (Weis, J.,
dissenting).
59. Id. at 1542.
60. Id. at 1544-45.
61. Id. at 1544.
62. Id. at 1544. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983)
(discussing standard of proof requirement).
63. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545.
64. Id. at 1545.
Parsing the numerous enforcement provisions of the federal securi-
ties regulations, the Third Circuit found "the general one-year-after-
discovery and three-years-after-the-violation" rule to be clearly the
dominant period of repose, with any exceptions thereto so focused
elsewhere as not to be germane to its analysis.6 5 Interestingly, the
court found the. "obvious" source of its predicament was that Con-
gress did not actually create the cause of action stemming from sec-
tion 10(b), and "its nubile offspring, Rule 10(b)-5."66 Here Circuit
Judge Aldisert opined in this evocative fashion:
Congress cannot be faulted for not providing a statute of limitations, because
the section 10(b) private cause of action was not enacted by it; it is a genie
sired solely by the judiciary, and the genie having escaped from the bottle is
not easily cabined. So the courts resort to the political science fiction of for-
mulating judicially-declared "statutes" of limitations, suggesting that this
would have been the intention of Congress had it created an express cause of
action. It is a sort of hermaphroditic process: the courts invent the remedy
and the seek to determine what would have been the intention of Congress as
to a statute of limitations had it expressly created the private damage action.
Because Congress takes no action to legislate to the contrary after an implied
cause of action has been judicially formulated, we conclude that by post hoc
inaction, Congress must have intended ante hoc that this is what it desired.
6 7
Having thus expressed both the problem and its most likely solu-
tion, the court declared that "[t]he necessity for uniform federal rem-
edies in security cases would seem to demand recourse to a uniform
federal statute of limitations .... [a]nd since uniformity is not to be
found in the diverse body of state [law] limitations, we are impelled
inexorably to look to federal limitations for borrowing purposes." 68
Moreover, a uniform federal limiting period "better reflects" the fed-
eral policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation.69
For all of these reasons, the Third Circuit adopted the one-year/
three year statute of limitations for section 10(b) actions.70 To be
sure, the tribunal did not meet the issue of retroactive application for
the rule it espoused herein.71
THE SHORT STORY OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
As discussed above, the Third Circuit played the role of pioneer in
forging a uniform one-year/three-year statute of limitations for se-
curities antifraud actions. The prestigious Seventh Circuit was the
next to add its influential voice in support of that proposition.
In Short v. Belleville Shoe Manufacturing Co.,72 the appellate
65. Id. at 1546.
66. Id. at 1546.
67. Id. at 1547.
68. Id. at 1549.
69. Id.
70. 1d, at 1550.
71. Id, at 1550-51.
72. 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991).
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bench faced what was essentially a family squabble. The plaintiff,
Marian Short, redeemed her shares in a closely held, family corpora-
tion on the advice of her brother, an officer of the company. 73 Ms.
Short claimed she was told the firm's outlook was gloomy; instead,
after the sale of her stock, the business prospered.74 Following a de-
lay of several years, the plaintiff sued under section 10(b), claiming
she was defrauded into selling what would eventually become valua-
ble securities. 7- The defendants argued to the panel that it should re-
ject Ms. Short's claim of equitable tolling, and borrow a three-year
period of repose from elsewhere in the securities law.76
Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Easterbrook initially noted
that the established practice of the Seventh Circuit for section 10(b)
litigation was to impose limiting periods borrowed from state "blue
sky" statutes, while adding "an overlay of tolling principles from
state and federal law."77 The tribunal did so because Congress had
not enacted a statute of limitations for such causes of action, "and
could hardly have been expected to-for the right... was created by
the courts rather than Congress."7 8  Indeed, the opinion frankly
stated that "[flederal courts are so accustomed to turning to state pe-
riods of limitations that we (and our colleagues in other circuits) did
this on auto-pilot, without discussing whether something differenti-
ated securities laws from other statutes."79
"Yet there are differences," opined Judge Easterbrook.80 First,
this lack of a statute of repose for section 10(b) was "a problem of the
courts' creation," not attributable to a Congressional oversight.8 1
Second, Congress "jammed" the securities regulation title with stat-
utes of limitation, even as recently as 1988.82 Third, because the se-
curities laws themselves are not triggered unless the underlying
transaction took place in interstate commerce, "[a]t least two state
statutes therefore could be applied in any case."8 3
73. Id at 1386.
74. Id
75. Id
76. Id, at 1386-87. See also 15 U.S.C. § 77(m) (1988). Also known as Section 13 of
the 1933 Securities Act, it establishes an absolute limit of three years on fraud actions
brought thereunder. Id






83. Id at 1388.
The panel took the first step committing itself to change at this
juncture. Observing initially that all this "would be by the by if the
Rules of Decision Act requires federal courts to use state law," the
court relied on DelCostello and Agency Holding to conclude that no
such mandatory requirements exist.8 4 The Seventh Circuit found the
recent Supreme Court cases called for a "fresh examination" of the
borrowing precept, and drawing further strength from the progres-
sive thinking advanced in Data Access, concluded that the time was
ripe for reconsideration of the borrowing issue as well.8 5
As did the Third Circuit, this tribunal found that the closer anal-
ogy was to be drawn from federal law, and the practicalities of litiga-
tion justified borrowing from a federal, and not a state, limitary
provision.8 6 Moreover, the translation of state periods of limitation
to the federal arena has historically led to troublesome questions in-
volving tolling and estoppel doctrines: whether to apply "the state's,
the federal court's, or both?"87 Judge Easterbrook pragmatically
stated:
[Tihe situation is a nightmare. Lawyers and courts alike devote untold hours
to identifying proper state analogies and applying multiple (conflicting or cu-
mulative) tolling doctrines .... Loud calls for reform issue from scholars and
the bar. With a unanimity unmatched in any other corner of securities law,
everyone wants a simpler way - and to everyone that means a uniform fed-
eral statute of limitations.88
Acknowledging that the Third Circuit had already "broke ranks in
Data Access" to achieve that lofty goal, the tribunal found no need to
shy away from the coming storm, and concluded it would apply a uni-
form federal statute of limitations to section 10(b) actions.8 9 As did
its brethren, this court did not address all questions regarding retro-
active application of its decision, noting that they presented "a ques-
tion of some subtlety," depending on the parties' reliance upon
former law.90
In establishing what that uniform federal limitary period should
be, this panel varied its approach from the benchmark decision in
Data Access. Here, the Seventh Circuit examined as options the one-
year/three-year limitation on misrepresentation actions, as set out in
section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933,91 and the newer five-year pe-
84. Id.
85. 1&
86. Id. at 1388. See also Id at 1393 (Posner, J., concurring). In his concurring
opinion, the erudite Judge Posner added his "small voice to the chorus," classifying the
entire issue of statute of limitations borrowing as "a matter of which round peg to stuff
in a square hole," and as an enterprise that "also runs the risk of applying one unprin-
cipled legislative deal to a problem entirely outside the scope of the deal." Id
87. Id. at 1389.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id, at 1389-90.
91. Id. at 1390, citing 15 U.S.C. § 77(m)(1988).
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riod of repose for insider trading violations.92 The one-year/three-
year rule was "attractive" because it antedated section 10(b), while
the five-year span had the virtue of representing the lawmakers' lat-
est insights, and permitted more time for plaintiffs to ferret out
wrongdoing. In the end, the ever-practical tribunal, eager to foster a
new uniform rule, but loath to create another intercircuit conflict,
followed the Third Circuit and adopted the one-year/three-year limi-
tation period, although upon a slightly different ground.93
In addition, the court found another benefit favoring the one-year/
three-year rule; its outer limit is a statute of repose, not limitation.94
This makes for a substantial difference in securities litigation, de-
clared the panel. "Prices of securities are volatile. If suit may be
postponed . . . then investors may gamble with other people's
money."9 5 Congress extensively utilized the one year from discov-
ery/three years from the event cap precisely to address that concern,
and thereby "ortailed the extent to which the securities laws permit
recovery based on the wisdom given by hindsight."96
A truly prudent person "almost always can sniff out fraud," com-
mented the court, whereas the three-year limitation would serve to
cut off the claims of only "the most trusting or somnolent or the
most wily" of plaintiffs.97 To be sure, employing the five-year period
from the unique insider trading prohibition would let the tail wag the
dog, especially since the passage of time does not impact the measure
of damages in such cases, where the harm perpetrated by the insiders
is usually fixed "within days after the trading, sometimes within
hours."98
In sum, the Seventh Circuit applied its customary cogent legal rea-
soning and incisive practicality by borrowing from the federal securi-
ties regulation title, thereby adopting the one-year/three-year
timeframe as a uniform statute of limitations for section 10(b). With
the Third Circuit having given birth to the new uniform rule, and the
Seventh Circuit lending paternalistic favor to it, the rapidly-growing
rule needed one last champion to form the triad that would ensure
its viability. The wait was not a long one.
92. ld. at 1390, citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a)(1988).
93. Id. at 1390-91.
94. Id at 1391.




CERES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
The appellate trilogy fittingly reached its zenith with a decision
from the Second Circuit, the tribunal long acknowledged as the
"mother court" of the federal securities laws.99 In Ceres Partners v.
GEL Associatesoo, a panel of the Second Circuit added its voice to
those advocating a one-year/three-year limitary period for antifraud
actions under the federal securities laws.
The plaintiff Ceres, a New Jersey partnership engaged in risk arbi-
trage, filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that the defendants had
violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose their inten-
tion to extend a merger offer to a public company, where Ceres held
a substantial equity position. Ceres brought this lawsuit to recover
the premium it would have received, had it known of the merger
plans and sold its shareholdings at the higher price subsequently of-
fered by the defendants.101
On the defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court turned to
the law of the forum on the question of timeliness. New York law
required that the limitary period of the plaintiff's state of residence
be controlling, and since Ceres was a New Jersey resident, the dis-
trict judge concluded that the rule of law set by the Third Circuit in
Data Access would govern. For that reason, he imposed the one-year/
three-year statute of limitation, and granted the dismissal motion.102
On appeal, the parties urged the tribunal to abandon its established
practice of borrowing state statutes of limitation for determining the
timeliness of section 10(b) actions. While both urged the adoption of
a uniform federal period, Ceres contended that the span should be
five years, and the defendants advocated the one-year/three-year pe-
riod of repose.103 Notably, the Securities and Exchange Commission
filed an amicus brief siding with the plaintiff, while several major ac-
counting firms joined the defendants in support of the lesser time
period.104
Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Kearse began by postulating
that the consistent tradition of the Second Circuit had been to adopt
the pertinent laws of the forum state, including local law directing
courts to borrow from other statutes of limitation.105 In so doing, the
tribunal had construed New York law to mean that, in antifraud liti-
gation, the cause of action normally accrues at the plaintiff's resi-
99. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
100. 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
101. Id, at 350-51.
102. Id. at 351-52.
103. 1i at 350.
104. Id. at 352.
105. I& at 353.
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dence. Thus, if the suit would be untimely in that jurisdiction, it
would also be time-barred in a New York federal court.
In the instant case, the Third Circuit one year/three year rule as
the controlling law in Ceres' home state of New Jersey applied, and
the action would have to be dismissed.10 6 However, the court did not
halt its analysis there.
Considering whether a uniform federal period of limitations should
govern section 10(b) actions, the circuit court acknowledged that the
accepted rationale for referring to state law where Congress fails to
specify a limiting period is derived from the Rules of Decision Act,
which declares state law prevails unless the Constitution or federal
law demands otherwise. 0 7 Nevertheless, the tribunal observed that
"[t]he practice of looking to state law to determine the applicable
statute of limitations for implied causes of action under the federal
securities laws has been the target of considerable criticism."108 In-
deed, Judge Kearse opined that application of the borrowing princi-
ple in antifraud litigation is diametrically opposed to the need for
uniform rules in the national arena of federal securities regulation.109
As evidence of that internecine conflict, Judge Kearse noted a
plethora of federal court decisions, all applying differing statutes of
limitation borrowed from state forums.110 Moreover, "far from
achieving any semblance of national uniformity, reference to state
laws generally results in a lack of uniformity even within a given cir-
cuit.""' The Second Circuit clearly expressed its dismay at this sad
state of affairs, highlighting the obvious inequities of how identical
suits, or even identical plaintiffs, could be time-barred in some states,
but not others.11:2
At this juncture, the tribunal pointed out that while the Supreme
Court has "noted the prevailing practice" of state law borrowing for
106. Id,
107. d, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
108. Ad at 354 (citations omitted).
109. Id, at 354.
110. 1l
111. Id In addition to partially cataloging the wide disparity vis-a-vis individual
state statutes of limitation, the tribunal exposited the confusion rampant not only be-
tween the federal circuits, but within each circuit jurisdiction as well. The panel re-
vealed the following diverse limitary periods were all employed by the appellate courts
of the nation: First Circuit - two, three, and six years; Second Circuit - two, six, and
six.plus years; Fourth Circuit - one, two, and three years; Sixth Circuit - three,
four, and six years; Seventh Circuit - two, three, and one-year/three-years; Ninth
Circuit - two and three years. Id at 345-55.
112. Id at 355.
section 10(b) claims, "it has not explicitly approved" such, and its re-
cent discussions of such borrowing for other types of suits "appear to
leave open the possibility that the courts should look to a federal
statute instead."113 Encouraged by what it perceived to be a change
in the prevailing winds, the panel made an extensive analysis of the
high Court's current rulings on the subject,"4 and concluded:
Among the themes to be distilled from the Supreme Court's recent borrowing
discussions are that selection of a uniform federal limitations period may be
warranted (1) where the statutory claim in question covers a multiplicity of
types of actions, leading to the possible application of a number of different
types of state statues of limitation, (2) where the federal claim does not pre-
cisely match any state-law claim, (3) where the challenged action is multistate
in nature, perhaps leading to forum shopping and inordinate litigation ex-
pense, and (4) where a federal statute provides a very close analogy.1 15
Against this "background of Supreme Court inroads into the tradi-
tional practice of borrowing from state law, and the crazy-quilt conse-
quences of borrowing from state law for federal securities laws
claims," this panel noted that its sister circuits had now abandoned
the state law borrowing tradition.1 6 After scrutinizing the opinions
of the Third and Seventh Circuits, the Second Circuit declared own
agreement with its brethren."7
Here Judge Kearse first elaborated upon the aspects which materi-
ally distinguish section 10(b) claims from state law fraud actions.
The court opined:
In some respects, the federal securities claim is narrower than a common-law
fraud claim in that the challenged behavior must bear on securities having a
nexus with interstate commerce. On the other hand, the goal of promoting
full disclosure is broader than that of common-law principles relating to
fraud, and leads to the imposition of a fiduciary-type level of disclosure on cer-
tain classes of individuals and institutions. Further, the fraud element of the
federal claim may be established not only by proof of a materially misleading
misstatement or omission, but also by proof of, e.g., a device, scheme, or arti-
fice to defraud, or of any act, practice, or course of business that operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, The types of claims that
may be brought under these federal laws, and the theories developed to sub-
stantiate those claims, range far beyond those developed under common-law
principles of fraud.1 1 8
The panel asserted that "the variety of claims" available under the
federal securities laws, and "their lack of analogue in state law" ren-
ders state law borrowing "not particularly appropriate." 119 Indeed,
that conclusion is enhanced, said the tribunal, by the multistate na-
ture of most of the challenged acts and the indisputably national
113. Id at 355-56.
114. Id. at 355-57.
115. Id. at 357.
116. Id at 357-58.
117. Id. at 360.
118. Id
119. Id
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character of registered securities.120 The circuit court therefore con-
cluded that a uniform nationwide period of limitation for securities
antifraud actions "is what Congress would have intended."l21
The Second Circuit joined its peers in the. view that the 1934 Act
itself clearly provides an analogy that is significantly more appropri-
ate than state law for a section 10(b) limitary period.122 Finding
"common goals" between the prohibitions against the use of false and
misleading statements in connection with the sale of securities,123
willful participation in manipulative marketing practices,124 and sec-
tion 10(b), the court indicated that the one-year/three-year statute of
limitations for the former provisions was the closest analogue to the
antifraud statute. 125 Moreover, the panel contrasted the two-year
limitation for actions compelling disgorgement by corporate insiders
of profits made on "short-swing" sales, 126 and found the underlying
statute dissimilar enough from section 10(b) to make the application
of that limitary period "less appropriate."'12 7
As to the contention of both the plaintiff and the SEC that the
five-year statute of limitations found in the Insider Trading and Se-
curities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988128 provided a better analogy,
Judge Kearse replied that Congress enacted a prolonged limitary pe-
riod in order to, among other things, accommodate the "difficulties of
ferreting out evidence sufficient to prosecute insider trading
cases."1 29 The tribunal lacked any indication that Congress intended
the five-year period of repose to extend beyond the special purposes
of the new statute, and therefore rejected the five-year limitation.130
In sum, the Second Circuit concluded that it was "significantly
more appropriate" to borrow the one-year/three-year statute of limi-
tation from elsewhere in the scheme of federal securities regulations
to be, than to apply available, inconsistent state statutes.131 Indeed,
the court added that "the federal policies underlying [those laws] and
120. Id.
121. Id. at 360-61.
122. Id. at 361.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c)(1988).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78(i)(e)(1988).
125. Ceres, 918 F.2d at 361-62.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
127. Ceres, 918 F.2d at 362.
128. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 5, 102 Stat. 4677, 4681 (1988), (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-
1(b)(4)(1988).
129. Ceres, 918 F.2d at 362-63 (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 363.
131. Id.
the practicalities of litigation" call out for such a uniform rule.132
Since the application of the new rule would not alter the outcome of
the present case, the order of dismissal was affirmed. More impor-
tantly, the tribunal left for another day "all questions concerning ret-
roactive application of our ruling."'133
Having now heard from the acknowledged leader of the appellate
courts in matters of the federal securities laws, the proponents of a
uniform limitary rule for section 10(b) could find great comfort in
the trilogy of cases validating the standardized one-year/three-year
period of repose. Yet, while the movement for uniformity in an-
tifraud litigation had reached its strongest point up to that time, per-
sistent voices in dissent ensured that the new rule was not beyond
reproach.
TRADITION V. UNIFORMITY-THE CIRCUIT CONFLICT EMERGES
As discussed, the Third Circuit in Data Access was the leader in es-
tablishing a uniform limitations period for securities antifraud ac-
tions. Also examined were the Seventh and Second Circuits'
applications of a uniform federal period in such matters.
However, not all of the circuit courts readily accepted the new uni-
form rule. Indeed, an equal number of tribunals either expressly re-
jected or refused to follow the teaching of Data Access. Instead, these
courts chose to adhere to the traditional borrowing of state statutes
of limitation for deciding the timeliness of section 10(b) lawsuits.
At the forefront of these proponents was the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. In Nesbit v. McNeil,134 decided after Data Access,
but prior to Short and Ceres, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with a
widowed plaintiff, who claimed her stockbroker had generated exces-
sive commissions by "churning" the securities account bequeathed to
her by her late husband.35
On appeal, the defendants attacked the long-standing precedents of
the Ninth Circuit which required the court to borrow the forum
state's limitations periods for securities antifraud actions.136 Making
short shrift of the Third Circuit's turn to a uniform federal rule,
Judge Fernandez summarily declared that the Data Access opinion
did not permit the panel "to adopt a different rule for this circuit."'137
Moreover, the court found that recent Supreme Court cases did not
compel a reassessment and reversal of their position. 3 8
132. Id
133. Id
134. 896 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1990).
135. Id at 381-82.
136. Id at 384.
137. Id
138. Id
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In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit not only refused to
follow its sister circuit, it simultaneously refuted the perspective of
its brethren that the latest pronouncements of the high Court did not
mandate a re-examination of the circuit's law on borrowing practices.
In addition, Judge Fernandez noted the panel's plain reluctance "to
apply such a determination retroactively in a manner that would cut
off the rights of a plaintiff whose action was timely under our deci-
sions which existed at the time the action was filed."'i 9
Ironically, the same result was obtained in the Tenth Circuit as
well. Before the Tenth Circuit came the appeal of Bath v. Bushkin,
Gaims, Gaines and Jonas,140 where the plaintiff sought review of a
judgment below that dismissed their claims as untimely.141
The question placed before the panel was whether the district
court erred in adopting the one-year/three-year rule of Data Access.
Writing per curiam, the tribunal declared "the rule in this circuit is
that [section 10(b)] suits are subject to the appropriate limitations
statute of the state in which the alleged violation occurred."142 Un-
willing to deviate from its established position, the Tenth Circuit re-
versed and remanded the antifraud claims "for further proceedings
under the most analogous state law limitations period."143
Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit joined its immediate predecessors by
retaining the state borrowing doctrine as the correct methodology for
determining limitations on securities antifraud actions. In Smith v.
Duff and Phelps, Inc. ,144 the defendant urged the appellate court to
adopt the uniform rule espoused by the Third Circuit.
Writing for the panel, Judge Johnson reminded the litigants that
in the Eleventh Circuit, "the statute of limitations for section 10(b)
claims is the period that the forum state applies to the most closely
analogous state claim."14 5 Declaring itself powerless to overrule the
cases that created this practice, the court refused to join in the revi-
sionary approach of Data Access.146 Significantly, in Smith the Elev-
enth Circuit noted parenthetically that the Supreme Court cases
139. Id,
140. 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990).
141. Id. at 818.
142. Id, (citing Hackhart V. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 1982)). The court
added it was "unaware of any circuit court electing to follow Data Access," a true state-
ment at that time. i'd. at 818-19.
143. Id at 819.
144. 891 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1990).
145. Id. at 1569-70.
146. I& at 1570.
relied upon by the Third Circuit, in its ground-breaking opinion, did
not directly apply to securities law actions. Apparently, the dissimi-
larity was potent enough to persuade this panel that a reversal of its
existing doctrine was not required.147
Against this backdrop, the controversy over a uniform limitary pe-
riod for section 10(b) actions had reached its apex. While the trilogy
discussed above propounded uniformity grounded upon the one-year/
three-year rule, other tribunals resisted the change, and instead ad-
hered to the tradition of borrowing from the forum state's closest an-
alogue to determine a statute of limitations. Thus, the die was cast,
and it was left to the Supreme Court to reconcile the opposing forces.
LIGHTING THE LAMPF
The New Rule - And a Disjointed Plurality
We now come to the penultimate decision in these matters, the
opinion of the Supreme Court in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson.148 As referred to in the prologue, the opinion
proved to be particularly divisive, with particularly vigorous dissents
filed by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, and a lukewarm concur-
rence by Justice Scalia. 149
The petitioner Lampf, Pleva was a New Jersey law firm that aided
in the organization of seven Connecticut limited partnerships that
failed. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the
tax shelter benefits that the entities had passed on to their investors.
This motivated the investors to become plaintiffs in a securities fraud
lawsuit against Lampf, Pleva and others.150
In the proceedings below, the district court determined that the
timeliness of the federal lawsuit would be governed by the forum
state's two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims, the most
analogous state cause of action available.151 Although that decision
was revised and remanded on appeal, the circuit panel also advocated
the borrowing of the forum state's two-year limitary period. "In view
of the divergence of opinion" among the federal circuits on the
proper limitations period for federal securities fraud claims, the high
147. Id at 1570 n.6.
148. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
149. Divided into four enumerated sections, with the second further subdivided into
three alphabetical parts, Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court with re-
spect to Parts I, II-B, III and IV. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices White, Marshall,
and Scalia joined therein. Justice Blackmun delivered an opinion with respect to Part
II-A, in which Rehnquist, White, and Marshall joined. The Scalia opinion concurred in
part and in the judgment. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor not only filed individual
dissents, but each joined in the other's taking of exception. Justice Stevens was joined
in his dissent by Justice Souter. Id., 111 S. Ct. at 2776.
150. Id.
151. Id at 2777.
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Court granted certiorari "to address this important issue."152
Three essential viewpoints on how best to resolve the controversy
were provided to the high Court. First, plaintiff-respondents main-
tained that the longstanding borrowing practice was still valid. Sec-
ond, the petitioner contended that a one year from discovery/three
years from the violation span was appropriate as a uniform federal
period, since such a limitation was consistent with related causes of
actions under 'the securities laws.15 3 Finally, the SEC argued for a
uniform period of repose under federal law, but urged the Court to
adopt the five-year statute of limitations employed in the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.154 The
agency submitted that such a period represented the most recent con-
gressional pronouncement regarding the enforcement scheme for
federal securities regulations.155
In commencing the Court's analysis, Justice Blackmun posited that
"it is the usual rule that when Congress has failed to.provide a stat-
ute of limitations for a federal cause of action a court 'borrow' or 'ab-
sorb' the local time limitation most analagous to the case at hand."156
As with any rule, however, the caveat is that exceptions do exist.
One pertinent exception is where the court examines federal law for
a suitable limitations period because use of the state time of repose
"would frustrate the policies embraced by the federal enactment."'157
Nevertheless, the high Court cautioned that the state borrowing
doctrine "may not be lightly abandoned," and warned that the prac-
tice of federal borrowing is a closely circumscribed exception, proper
only where federal law provides a tighter fit than the available state
law.158 "Predictably, this determination is, a delicate one,'! acknowl-
edged the high tribunal.I59
To accomplish this sensitive task, the Court looked to its "hierar-
chical inquiry for ascertaining the appropriate limitations period for a
federal cause of action where Congress has not set the time within
which such action must be brought."'160 First, and quite logically so,
the court must determine whether a uniform statute of limitations is
152. Id, at 2776-77.
153. Id at 2777.
154. Id, at 2777-78. See supra, note 128.





160. Id, at 2778-79.
even appropriate. Where the federal cause is diverse, Justice Black-
mun opined that "federal interests in predictability and judicial econ-
omy counsel the adoption of one source, or class of sources, for
borrowing purposes." 161 The natural conclusion is the adoption of a
single federal provision or a "single variety" of state actions to bor-
row from.162
Once it is determined that a uniform statute of limitations is appro-
priate, the Court must decide whether to rely upon a state or federal
source for the limitary period. Here, the multistate nature of a par-
ticular federal claim indicates a need for uniformity grounded in fed-
eral law. Lastly, even if the terrain points to federal borrowing, the
strong presumption in favor of borrowing from the forum state "re-
quires that a court determine that an analogous federal source truly
affords a 'closer fit' with the cause of action at issue than does any
available state-law source."'163
Complicating the Court's analysis were "the nontraditional origins
of the section 10(b) cause of action," specifically the fact that a pri-
vate claim was purely a judicial creation out of whole cloth.164 "It is
therefore no surprise that the provision contains no statute of limita-
tions."'165 This left the high bench "with the awkward task of dis-
cerning what the limitations period Congress intended [the judiciary]
to apply to a cause of action it never really knew existed."166
Fortunately, the Court did find that the progenitors of section
10(b) left some guidance for their descendants. Postulating that,
where a claim is implied from a statute containing an express cause
of action possessed of its own explicit time limitation, a court should
look to that originating statute first in determining the limitary span
for the implied action. Furthermore, if that parent law has "compa-
rable express remedial provisions, the inquiry usually should be at
end."16 7 Borrowing from state law should only be a last resort if no
counterpart is available to the statute in question, since there is "no
clearer indication" of how the lawmakers would have legislated
"than the balance struck by Congress in limiting similar and related
protections."168
Bringing this rationale to the instant case, the Court found that the
provisions of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act include "a number of
express causes of action, each [with] some variation of a 1-year period
161. Id, at 2779.
162. Id. at 2778-79.
163. IdM at 2779. The Court added that "commonality of purpose and similarity of
elements will be relevant" to this inquiry. Id
164. Id.
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after discovery combined with a 3-year period of repose."169
Indeed, the opinion set forth the unmistakable nexus between
those companion provisions and section 10(b), finding that they "tar-
get the precise dangers that are the focus" of the antifraud rule, each
being "an integral element of a complex web of regulations," in-
tended to facilitate the protection of investors and the honest func-
tioning of the securities marketplace. 170
Taking comfort in the foregoing conclusions, the Court then found
it must per force reject the SEC's contention that a five-year statute
of limitations was appropriate. 171 The five-year period was a surgical
insertion, according to the Court, post-dating the original regulatory
enactments by more than fifty years, and was specifically designed to
address the problem of insider trading.172 The court reasoned that
there was no indication that the drafters... intended to extend the
enhanced protection elsewhere within the regulatory matrix. 173 In-
deed, the Court found that the explicit disclaimer of any effect by the
new insider trading prohibition on other securities laws was evidence
that the five-year statute of limitations was strictly limited to its orig-
inal statute. 174
In a similar vein, the Court discounted the argument that differing
limitary periods for these interrelated prohibitions would subject
much of the same conduct to two distinct periods of repose.175
"There is no inconsistency" in this, held the Court, because "Con-
gress sought to alter the remedies available in insider trading cases,
and only in insider trading cases," via the longer statute of limita-
tions. 176 Furthermore, the strengthened insider trading ban also im-
plicitly overlaps other securities law provisions, including those
already utilizing the one-year/three-year span.
The agency's final contention, that adoption of the shorter one and
three-year period would "frustrate the policies underlying § 10(b),"
was rejected. 177 Again harking to the aforementioned examples of
limitary periods already at work in the federal securities laws, the
169. Id Moreover, the Court pointed out that in 1934 the Congress also amended
the 1933 Securities Act to conform to this one-year/three-year architecture. Id,






176. Id. (emphasis in the original).
177. Id.
high bench concluded that Congress believed a three-year period was
sufficient for the bringing of an action under section 10(b).178
In closing this portion of the opinion, the Court rejected a fortiori
that borrowing from state law was appropriate here. The Court
stated, "[Tihe analytic framework we adopt above makes considera-
tion of state-law alternatives unnecessary where Congress has pro-
vided an express limitations period for correlative remedies within
the same enactment."179
Winding down from this new landmark, the Court made an addi-
tional ruling, disturbing to some,'8 0 that it was going to put aside the
"venerable doctrine" of equitable tolling as to these plaintiffs. The
new one and three-year structure, explained Justice Blackmun, is
"fundamentally inconsistent" with equitable tolling. "Because the
purpose of the 3-year limitation is clearly to serve as a cutoff," the
Court held that tolling principles did not apply to that period.181
In conclusion, for its closing, the Supreme Court announced that:
Litigation instituted pursuant to § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 therefore must be
commenced within one year after the discovery of facts constituting the viola-
tion and within three years after such violation.
18 2
As there was no dispute that the instant actions were filed after
the lapse of three years from the complained of acts, the claims were
decreed to be untimely.l8 3
The Vocal Opposition
As previously noted, the plurality decision in Lampf was anything
but the unified opinion of the Supreme Court. Of all the discordant
voices, that of Justice Kennedy, the last to be heard from, spoke most
eloquently for a different result. To be sure, Justice Kennedy agreed
that a uniform federal statute of limitations for section 10(b) actions
was appropriate, and even went so far as to assent to the one-year
from discovery prong of the new limitary period. 8 4
However, in his dissent, joined in by Justice O'Connor, Justice
Kennedy opposed the three-year period of repose now also adopted,
arguing that "[t]his absolute time-bar . . .conflicts with traditional
limitations periods for fraud-based actions," frustrates the utility of
the antifraud statute's protections for investors, and "imposes fewer
practical limitations" on cases prosecuted thereunder. 8 5
178. Id,
179. Id at 2781-82.
180. See iqfra, notes 200-57 and accompanying text.
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While disagreeing with the majority, Justice Kennedy did not criti-
cize its methodology, finding it sensible to search for a limitations pe-
riod among section 10(b)'s companion provisions. 86 However, the
availability of that mode of analysis does not replace the concomitant
obligation to carefully consider the avowed goal of the law and reject
any possible rule that would impede the very policies behind the stat-
ute in question. 18
7
In the instant holding, Justice Kennedy noted that the plurality
did not lock onto one statute and bind itself to its terms. 88 Rather,
the Court referred to three limitary periods within the 1934 Act, re-
jected out of hamd the one with a two-year statute of repose, and pur-
ported to follow the two others containing one-year/three-year
limitary periods. 189 But of even greater importance to Justice Ken-
nedy was the fact that neither of the latter two statutes related to a
cause of action of the scope and coverage of section 10(b), nor did
either rest on the common law fraud model behind the majority of
federal antifraud suits.190
Highlighting the "significant protections" for investors that section
10(b) embodies as a "comprehensive antifraud provision," the Ken-
nedy dissent reminds us that private litigation thereunder is to be en-
couraged as supporting a Congressional policy of "combatting all
forms of securities fraud."'19 1 Even so, the complexity of modern se-
curities markets make for significant obstacles to the bringing of such
suits.19 2
The real burden on most investors, concluded Justice Kennedy, is
the initial matter of discovering the alleged fraud in the first place, as
concealment of the fraud is a given for stock market pirates.193 For
this reason, "[tihe practicalities of litigation, indeed the simple facts
186. Id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S.
56, 68 n.4 (1988).
189. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The plurality's rejoinder was that "the
one- and-three-year scheme represents an indivisible determination by Congress as to
the appropriate cutoff point" for section 10(b) claims. Any bifurcation thereof would
be a disservice to that legislative decision, and, moreover, precedent did not support
"borrowing only a portion of an express statute of limitations. Indeed, such a practice
comes close to the type of judicial policymaking that our borrowing doctrine was in-
tended to avoid." Id at 2782 n.8.
191. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
of business life," are such that the newly minted rule is doomed to
subjugate the Congressional intent for section 10(b) to be a viable
weapon for the wronged investor.194 Justice Kennedy opined:
By adopting a 3-year period of repose, the Court makes a § 10(b) action all but
a dead letter for injured investors who by no conceivable standard of fairness
or practicality can be expected to file suit within three years after the viola-
tion occurred. 1 9 5
Moreover, declared the Justice, "the Court also turns its back on
the almost uniform rule rejecting short periods of repose for fraud-
based actions."19 6 Significantly, even those forums that do entertain
abridged spans of repose "typically permit actions to be brought
within at least five years." 197 In a somewhat barbed comment, Jus-
tice Kennedy pointed out that Congress had recognized such facts by
mandating the five-year statute of limitations for insider trading, yet
this Court failed to come to the same realization.198
In summation, Justice Kennedy found that the three-year repose
period "simply tips the scale too far in favor of wrongdoers."1 99 He
concluded:
The Court's decision today forecloses any means of recovery for a defrauded
investor whose only mistake was not discovering a concealed fraud within an
unforgiving period of repose. As fraud in the securities market remains a seri-
ous national concern, Congress may decide that the rule announced by the
Court today should be corrected. But even if prompt congressional action is
taken, it will not avail defrauded investors caught by the Court's new and un-
forgiving rule, here applied on a retroactive basis to a pending action. With
respect, I dissent and would remand with instructions that a § 10(b) action
may be brought at any time within one year after an investor discovered or
should have discovered a violation.2 00
Notwithstanding Justice Kennedy's erudite dissent, Justice
O'Connor felt compelled not only to join therein, but to memorialize
her own differences with the plurality.201 Interestingly, Mr. Justice
Kennedy was moved to return the favor and joined in her dissent as
well. 202
Not surprisingly, Justice O'Connor agreed that "predictability and
judicial economy counsel the adoption of a uniform federal statute of
limitations" for section 10(b) actions.203 However, explicitly siding
with Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor advocated adoption of only
the one-year from discovery aspect of the new standard, and not the
194. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
196. 1I (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
198. Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 2785 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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three-year period of repose.20 4 Otherwise implying full accord with
her fellow dissenter, Justice O'Connor stipulated she was only writ-
ing separately to "express my disagreement with the Court's decision
... to apply the new limitations period in this case."205
Characterizing the instant decision as a drastic departure from es-
tablished practice and, moreover, inflicting an injustice on the plain-
tiffs, Justice O'Connor took the Court to task for "declin[ing] to
explain its unprecedented decision, or even to acknowledge its unu-
sual character." 20 6 In an almost mocking tone, the dissent comments
that the opinion "shuts the courthouse door" on the parties "because
they were unable to predict the future."20 7
Dispelling any notion that this retroactive application of the new
rule constituted the Supreme Court's standard practice, Justice
O'Connor remonstrated that:
This Court has, on several occasions, announced new statutes of limitations.
Until today, however, the Court had never applied a new limitations period
retroactively to the very case in which it announced the new rule so as to bar
an action that was timely under binding Circuit precedent. Our practice has
been instead to evaluate the case at hand by the old limitations period, reserv-
ing the new rule for application in future cases.
2 0 8
This principle, Justice O'Connor pointed out, was based on "funda-
mental notions of justified reliance and due process," implemented to
insure a party its day in court.209
Detailing why the Court was remiss in failing to apply that doc-
trine here, Justice O'Connor opined:
First, in adopting a federal statute of limitations, the Court overrules clearly
established Circuit precedent; the Court admits as much. Second, the Court
explains that "the federal interes[t] in predictability" demands a uniform stan-
dard. I agree, but surely predictability cannot favor applying retroactively a
limitations period that the respondent could not possibly have foreseen.
Third, the inequitable results are obvious. After spending four-and-one-half
years in court and tens of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees, respondents'
suit is dismissed for failure to comply with a limitations period that did not
exist until today.2 1 0
Doubting that the bench's "cursory treatment" was an oversight, Jus-
tice O'Connor criticized the Court for "visiting unprecedented unfair-
ness" on the plaintiffs "for reasons unknown and unexplained" in
204. 1d. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
205. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
206. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
207. Id at 2785-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
208. Id at 2786 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
209. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
210. Id at 2787 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
choosing to ignore the issue.211
Another note of disharmony was struck by Justice Stevens, who
declared that the Court in this decision "has undertaken a lawmak-
ing task that should properly be performed by Congress."212 Joined
by Justice Souter in his dissent, Mr. Justice Stevens found defective
both the premise that section 10(b) causes were "created out of whole
cloth by the judiciary," and the concomitant belief that the bench
"must also have the authority to fashion the time limitations applica-
ble" thereto.213
Taking a historical tack, Justice Stevens noted that for four de-
cades, the federal courts had successfully administered securities
fraud litigation by borrowing state statutes of limitations.214 While
admitting a uniform federal rule would be superior "to the often cha-
otic traditional approach of looking to the analogous state limitation,"
Justice Stevens nevertheless declared that:
Congress, rather than the federal judiciary, has the responsibility for making
the policy determinations that are required in rejecting a rule selected under
the doctrine of state borrowing, long applied in § 10(b) cases, and choosing a
new limitations period and its associated tolling rules... When the Court ven-
tures into this lawmaking arena, however, it inevitably raises questions con-
cerning the retroactivity of its new rule that are difficult and arguably
inconsistent with the neutral, non-policy making role of the judge.2 15
Moreover, this repudiation of the established state borrowing rule
was not justified by the Court's precedents.2 16 Nothing in the securi-
ties acts provides a basis for a departure from that practice, found
Justice Stevens.217 Interestingly, his dissent viewed the controlling
opinion as failing to find an intent by the legislators to pattern sec-
tion 10(b) after the sections subject to the one-year/three-year
limitations.218
Justice Stevens summed up his disagreement with these words:
The policy choices that the Court makes today may well be wise - even
though they are at odds with the recommendation of the Executive Branch -
but that is not a sufficient justification for making a change in what was well-
settled law during the years between 1946 and 1988 governing the timeliness
of action impliedly authorized by a federal statute. This Court has recognized
that a rule of statutory construction that has been consistently applied for sev-
eral decades acquires a clarity that "is simply beyond peradventure." Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). I believe that the Court
should continue to observe that principle in this case.2 19
In contrast to the vociferous dissents discussed above, the concur-
211. Id at 2787-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 2783-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 2783 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Id at 2784 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
216. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
218. Id at 2784-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id at 2785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ring opinion of Justice Scalia was relatively mild in asserting its
viewpoint. Nevertheless, in concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, Justice Scalia was no less firm in the position he
expressed.220
The gist of the Scalia opinion was that while accepting the existing
precedents of the Court, he "continue[d] to disagree with the method-
ology" employed. 22 1 Justice Scalia asserted that "absent a congressio-
nally created limitations period state periods govern, or, if they are
inconsistent with the purposes of the federal act, no limitation period
exists."222 Finding the present case particularly troublesome because
"it involve[d] one of those so-called 'implied' causes of action," Justice
Scalia disdainfully observed that such functions were not the proper
domain of federal tribunals.223
With this fait accompli, however, the question arises as to what
limitary period applies. Congress has not had an opportunity to con-
sider whether the state limitation is adequate or if it would prefer to
craft its own rule, observed Justice Scalia.224 "That lack of opportu-
nity is particularly apparent in the present case, since Congress did
create special limitations periods for the Securities Exchange Act
causes of action that it actually enacted." 225
Finding it "too lawless to be imagined" to imply twofold a statute
of limitations for a likewise implied cause of action, Justice Scalia
opined that the more responsible approach, where the enactment oc-
casioning the creation of an implied right contained a limitations pe-
riod for an analogous cause, would be to use that limitations
period.226 Agreeing that "[w]e are imagining here," Mr. Justice
Scalia joined in the plurality's decision to borrow from the limitary
periods of related provisions of the federal securities acts.227
In conclusion, in Lampf the Supreme Court shed new light on the
issue of limiting the time in which to bring an action pursuant to sec-
tion 10(b). Verifying the correctness of the circuit trilogy's choice in
220. I& at 2785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 2783 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
222. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
223. Id. at 2783 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
224. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
225. Id, (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (emphasis in the
original) (citations omitted).
226. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
227. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia
refused to join in the portion of the opinion setting forth the anti-state borrowing anal-
ysis. Id
selecting the one-year/three-year limitary period from elsewhere in
the federal securities laws, the Court reconciled its traditional state
borrowing doctrine with the exceptions thereto that recent holdings
had developed and utilized as necessary. Without a doubt, the
Supreme Court has added a note of finality (for the moment) to the
limitations controversy, endowing stability and fairness to the confus-
ing matter of discerning the appropriate statute of limitations for se-
curities antifraud actions.
However, Lampf does not represent the last word on such matters.
Still open for debate and adjudication is the possible apparent retro-
active application of the new rule. Already the trial courts are
fraught with disarray on this point. Initiatives for remedial legisla-
tion are presently under way to address that concern, as well as the
basic question of the desirability of the one-year/three-year limita-
tion period as a statute of repose for the vitally important antifraud
statute. This article's analytical segment shall commence with the
latter controversy, after an examination of one final point on modern
limitary periods that went virtually overlooked in Lampf.
THE NEW GENERAL FEDERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-AN
OVERLOOKED REMEDY OR A CASE OF Too LITTLE, Too
LATE?
As the foregoing has exemplified, the raison d'tre of this writing
is to address the longstanding quandary of providing a workable stat-
ute of limitations for securities antifraud actions. To be sure, the
problem of interstitially selecting an appropriate limitary period for a
statute ranges far and wide throughout the many codifications of fed-
eral law. For that reason, Congress recently enacted a new omnibus
statute to help alleviate that difficulty. While the cases discussed
herein have essentially overlooked that new alternative, it may yet
be helpful in resolving this modern dilemma.
Congress recently passed into law the Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990,228 which made a number of changes to title 28, the federal
Judicial Code. The focus was on the promulgation of a new general
federal statute of limitations within the judiciary title.229 The emi-
nent Professor Siegel critiqued the new provision as follows:
Section 1658 is the new limitations provision enacted by the 1990 Judicial Im-
provements Act. It adopts a uniform and general statute of limitations for
federal causes of action not governed by any special one, settling on a period
of four years. This could be quite a gift to the federal lawyer and just as much
so to the federal bench, which has spent many unnecessary hours hunting for
appropriate time provision to apply to a variety of federal claims. But this
228. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1653 (1990)).
229. 1&
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statute turns out to be hardly any gift at all for the reason that it applies only
to causes of action or claims created by Congress after December 1, 1990, the
effective date of the Judicial Improvements Act. The myriad of pre-existing
claims, recognized by either statutory or decisional law, continue to be gov-
erned by whatever is outside of § 1658, and the ground outside § 1658 is often
hostile territory.
2 3 0
Expressing dismay with the shortcomings of this otherwise long-
awaited revision, the commentary viewed this "halting step of enact-
ing a uniform general period for future-created claims" as inadequate
for its failure to address existing claims.231 Nevertheless, the daunt-
ing Professor Siegel went on to offer that "it may sometimes be ap-
propriate to argue that § 1658 and its four-year period, while not
directly applicable, should be the statute applied anyway." 232 In do-
ing so, it would appear that the learned academician is promoting an
expansive use of the new general federal limitary period, in order to
facilitate the very kind of interstitial lawmaking that so many federal
courts have wrestled with in the absence of express federal statutes
of limitation.
To be sure, Justice Blackmun dismissed the new section 1658 as
"obviously [having] no application" in Lampf.233 It is perplexing to
find that the Supreme Court brusquely dismissed that recent enact-
ment in an incidental footnote to Lampf. Considering that the Court
was confronted with the difficult task of selecting an appropriate lim-
itary period for a uniquely federal statute, it is hard to understand
why the plurality would virtually ignore the efficacy of a new provi-
sion, so readily available to it, without a further explanation of the
basis for its decision.
One could presume that the Court believed its own revised borrow-
ing doctrine would not allow it to borrow a general catch-all statute
such as the new section 1658. To be sure, the Court's modern teach-
ings, as set forth inrfra, require that, if borrowing from the forum
state's periods of repose is inappropriate, the next venue to be pe-
rused is the analogous federal law. As this implies looking first
within the same regulatory scheme before embarking on a journey
throughout the federal statutes at large, the plurality may have felt
constrained to delimit its venture into the securities acts alone. No
doubt satisfied with the one-year/three-year rule found in adjacent
230. Siegel, "The Statute of Limitations In Federal Practice, Including The New
"General" One in Federal Question Cases," 134 F.R.D 481, 482 (1991).
231. Id. at 484.
232. Id at 487.
233. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2782-83.
portions of the securities regulation title, the Court ended its search
there, thereby never approaching the four-year statute of limitation
codified later in the judicial title.
Moveover, Congress did nothing to advance the cause of its new
creation, declaring it was applicable to new rights of action only. By
reason of this almost self-defeating omission, the legislators pre-
cluded the general statute of limitations from being used to solve
many of the troublesome limitary questions plaguing the congested
federal system. The instant case of section 10(b) is probably the most
glaring example of the negative ramifications of this oversight. Had
Congress mandated a wider application for section 1658, it may very
well have provided sufficient latitude for the Supreme Court to en-
tertain additional thought as to the propriety of a four-year statute of
repose, either in place of or in conjunction with a variation of the
one-year/three-year rule it ultimately adopted.
At the end of the day, the fact remains that the Lampf Court put
to one side the general four-year statute of limitations, enacted only
months before the Justices adopted the one-year/three-year rule.
Nevertheless, the efficacy of the former limitary period cannot be
overlooked. It will ultimately remain for Congress to decide what it
thinks is best for antifraud actions.
Is ONE-AND-THREE Too SHORT FOR SECTION 10(B)?
Before landing any criticism upon the one-year/three-year rule
that has now devolved upon the federal securities code, one should
bear in mind the Solomonic-like wisdom required for the herculean
task of propounding such a provision in the first place. In overview-
ing the process of selecting a limitary period for section 10(b) actions,
Judge Posner pointed out the tremendous difficulties inherent
therein, stating:
The considerations bearing on the suitability of one limitations period com-
pared to another include the difficulty of investigating potential violations, the
possibility that the consequences of wrongdoing will be delayed, the opportu-
nities for wrongdoers to conceal the wrong, the rate at which evidence of
wrongdoing and also evidence pertinent to the alleged wrongdoer's defenses is
likely to decay, the sophistication of the relevant tribunals in handling stale
evidence, the desirability of freeing court time for fresh claims, the interest of
potential defendants in repose - that is, in knowing after a definite period
has passed that they no longer have to worry about being sued - and the ef-
fect on the deterrence of statutory violators of reducing the time for bringing
suit.
2 3 4
Obviously, the measurement of these factors is best left to the leg-
islative branch, as so correctly noted by Justice Stevens in his concur-
rence in Lampf. But in advancing to the next evolutionary level for
the nascent limitary rule, let us look to these conflicting tensions.
234. Short, 908 F.2d at 1394 (Posner, J. concurring).
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Certainly, the competing interests on the limitations issue are in-
deed sharply defined. Taking the view of prospective plaintiffs first,
it is beyond cavil that the courts, especially the Supreme Court, have
historically viewed private antifraud litigation as a vital corollary to
regulatory enforcement, as prosecuted by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. Undoubtedly cognizant of the limited resources
of the SEC and its state counterparts in the vast securities market-
place, and the overwhelming need to provide defrauded investors
with a formidable remedy, the jurisprudence of section 10(b) can only
be viewed as encouraging private litigants to enforce their rights
against the pirates and buccaneers of the stock exchanges. Indeed,
the events of modern times have served only to reinforce, if not to-
tally renew, that dogma.
Viewed from that perspective, one quickly appreciates the need for
a limitary period that provides an adequate, if not generous, time
frame in which litigants may commence an action. Parenthetically, it
should be said that the imposition of a uniform limitary rule need not
be a concern to potential plaintiffs. While it is true that in the past
certain fora have granted plaintiffs a more expansive allotment of
the time in which to sue, it would seem to this commentator that the
limitary sword often cuts the other way, acting in a less favorable fo-
rum to banish a complaint as time-barred. Putting the calendar
aside, a uniform rule serves to remove one more substantive road-
block to the lawsuit, a matter ultimately beneficial to the prosecuting
party.
Returning to what a representative plaintiff would contend is the
most appropriate period, no doubt such a party would argue that the
very "antifraud" object of section 10(b) demands a maximum alloca-
tion of time to sue. After all, fraud is unquestionably a bad thing; its
malum in se nature is indisputable. Moreover, such fraud must for-
ever be guarded from in the stock exchanges, as those marketplaces
represent the very lifeblood of our economic system. One can even
argue persuasively that a prime remedy to prevent such fraud upon
the securities marketplace must be available at virtually any time as
the key weapon to oust such wrongdoing from our capital markets.
After all, are not these vandals of Wall Street a clever lot? Could
they not, as history has shown, conceal their fraud for many years,
before some private or governmental inquiry exposes it to the light of
justice?23 5
235. See 3 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, Securities Fraud and Commodities Fraud § 7.3
Simply put, proponents of the foregoing would say that section
10(b) must be relatively unfettered, its longevity virtually unlimited,
in order to deter and defeat the barbarians at the very gates of the
exchanges. A statute of limitation or repose, they say, should range
as far and as wide as possible, in order to deny evildoers any comfort
from the passage of time. By mandating a short and intractable pe-
riod of repose, any limitary period may very well punish the hapless
investor "whose only mistake was not discovering a concealed fraud
within an unforgiving period of repose."236
Clearly, the foregoing goes to the upper limitation, if any, on the
overall time in which to commence an antifraud suit. It also serves
as the natural segue into the companion question of imposing a limi-
tary period commencing from the date of the discovery of the fraud.
Here the prospective plaintiff's argument loses some steam. After
all, once the fraud is discovered, why hasten to bring suit? But their
contentions regain speed somewhat quickly.
Consider first Rule 11,237 which requires a good faith basis upon
which to bring a lawsuit. Litigants and their counsel are dutybound
to investigate the propriety of the contemplated action before com-
mencing it. A failure to act in accordance with the rule could mean
the imposition of sanctions and penalties. Likewise, a short distance
down the litigation trail is the requirement that allegations of fraud
be pled with particularity.238 Similar to the requirements under Rule
11, the anticipating plaintiff must have, at the very least, something
of substance upon which to ground her pleadings. The lack of a firm
foundation upon which to allege fraudulent conduct condemns the
lawsuit to a quick and certain dismissal.
Indeed, even if an amendment to the pleadings is permitted, the
lack of a guarantee of that opportunity makes the "file first, amend
later" option a foolhardy risk, and potentially a costly one under
Rule 11. Moreover, to be totally Machiavellian, it alerts the opposi-
tion to storm clouds on the horizon, permitting the defendants to bat-
ten down, while serving no useful purpose for the plaintiffs.
Thus, it becomes patently obvious to even the most casual observer
that haste is not only waste, it may very well mean an abrupt and
final conclusion to the litigation. For reason of the strictures of the
Federal Rules and cases thereunder, a prospective plaintiff should
not rush headfirst into filing a lawsuit. Rather, some deliberation is
an absolute necessity, and, of course, that takes some time. Investiga-
tion, research, contemplation, and the myriad other tasks that go into
at 220-27, (informative catalog of the diverse and innovative artifices conceived by
stock market pirates).
236. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
237. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
238. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(B).
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the deliberative process are necessary precursors to commencing the
lawsuit, and the limitation period measuring from the time the fraud
is discovered must per force accommodate these demands.
Part and parcel of this aspect is the definition of what constitutes
"discovery" of the fraud. To be sure, even under pre-existing stan-
dards, that point was hotly contested more often than not, especially
in securities cases. Pinning down the date the alleged fraud was or,
more importantly in some cases, should have been discovered is at its
best an inexact science.
Rarely are the crossroads clearly mapped out; in most instances,
the terrain is uncertain, the borders fuzzy. Any number of or type of
event may at the time seem inconspicuous, nonthreatening or an in-
sufficient basis upon which to initiate litigation. Yet, with the benefit
of 20/20 hindsight, the defendants will surely point to such as the day
the clock began to tick and counter that the allotted time from dis-
covery to the filing of suit has expired. Even where a tax audit, SEC
inquiry or other such independent event transpires, the ultimate re-
sult is usually not readily apparent. Having suspicion but little else
at that time, the wronged investor watches helplessly as time runs
out before evidence substantial enough to commence suit accumu-
lates from the time of the first inkling of fraud.
Lastly, if nothing else, all of this potential for controversy provides
wrongdoers with fertile ground for tactical maneuvering in court.
Undoubtedly, the most guilty of defendants will stalwartly utilize
this bone of contention as astutely as possible. At best, it could pro-
vide a basis for forever disposing of the litigation. At worst, it wears
down the opposition, consumes time and money, and may even dis-
courage more ardent pursuit.
It is no wonder plaintiffs argue for the most expansive time frame
possible as measured from the date of discovery of the fraud. Their
points are well taken. A liberal time-from-discovery rule fosters less
haste, and ergo less waste, by permitting parties to adequately, if not
exhaustively, investigate the merits of their claims. To be sure, one
could argue with a straight face that in the first instance baseless
suits would need not even be brought, for reason of the thorough in-
vestigation that such liberal rules of time would allow, thereby saving
precious judiciad resources. After all, a plaintiff benefitting by a gen-
erous post-discovery period to prepare his lawsuit could and should
be harshly dealt with by a court, if one demonstrates that the plain-
tiff whiled away her time, doing nothing to bring the best-prepared
case to court. And litigation later proven an inflammatory "strike
suit" could not hide behind the excuse of a hurried filing made to get
in "under the wire" of a limitary provision.
In sum, we have all the rationales offered by plaintiffs in support
of the most lengthy uniform statute of limitations possible for litiga-
tion pursuant to section 10(b). In all fairness, said arguments do not
lack merit. But before any reader succumbs to the notion that the
instant writing is biased towards the suitors' side, let us turn to the
equally cogent, equally erudite arguments made by the defendants'
camp, in favor of the shortest possible limitary period for securities
antifraud lawsuits.
Understandably, putative defendants, typically the securities and
financial firms, lawyers, and, especially in these times, the major ac-
counting firms, have sought to minimize their exposure to securities
fraud suits by arguing in favor of the shortest limitary period possible
for such actions.239 To be sure, this author would be one of the last
to favor a rule of limitation that would expose the already-belea-
guered financial, legal, and accounting professions to even more
broadside litigation, as commenced by disgruntled investors in search
of a deep (and solvent) pocket.240 These essential elements of the
business world are already besieged, and in many cases unjustly, with
enough securities litigation to last for years. Their call for relief
therefrom is certainly worthy of heed. As with the flip side of a
newly minted coin, their arguments to foreshorten the limitary pe-
riod shine just as brightly and are just as persuasive.
The essential raison d'tre of those who have or may occupy the
defendants table in a section 10(b) lawsuit begins with the old adage
that the business of America is business. With that as a given, busi-
ness then needs the law to shield it from the protracted threat of dis-
ruptive litigation. Business cannot function properly or efficiently,
say the captains of industry (and rightly so) if the time for commenc-
ing litigation against them is oppressively long. The shortest possible
limitary periods, they contend, assures free enterprise that it can
move forward without fear of past history coming back to haunt it.
The "litigation risk," like any other component of economics, is
something the modern business entity measures on a cost-effective
basis. To be sure, this writer does not speak here in defense of bla-
tant perpetrators of securities fraud. Rather, the object of the instant
239. Several major accounting firms filed a brief as amici curiae in Ceres supporting
the one-year/three-year period. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
240. See Anthony M. Sabino, "Big Eight" Beware: Multinational Accounting firms
and The Increasing Scope of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 467, 502-10 (1989). The author addresses the quandary the
now "Big Six" accounting firms and others confront as they expand their international
network. While these organizations seek to benefit from business opportunities in the
international forum, they also face significant exposure to litigation under American
securities laws and regulations.
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discussion is the company financial advisor or professional who bears
at least some risk of a section 10(b) suit merely by participating in
the capital market in some capacity. For them the potential to be a
defendant is not necessarily a function of wrongdoing; it may instead
be grounded upon various and sundry things, such as a deleterious
change in the economic or legal environment, mistakes in business
judgment, misplaced optimism in forecasting the future or the mere
fact that it is the "deep pocket" targeted by disgruntled investors or,
worse yet, "quick-buck" artists out to scam a settlement in lieu of a
costly lawsuit. This, then, is the risk of litigation that every business,
and especially those involved in the stock markets, must take mea-
sure of, and accordingly guard against.
No wonder then that those imperiled by that risk seek to minimize
its harmful effects. One highly effective way to do so is to circum-
scribe the time in which the risk is viable. Statues of limitation, be-
cause of the finality they impose upon causes of action, accomplish
precisely that. Obviously, if the time for suit has passed, the erst-
while defendant can raise the expiry of the limitation period as an
affirmative defense. On balance, that should lead to a quick and in-
expensive disposition of the suit.
Conveniently for our purposes, here the thinking of potential de-
fendants forks into two branches. First, let the statute limit the time
in which to sue, as measured from the discovery of the alleged viola-
tion. This achieves a number of worthwhile goals. It assists those
who may be defendants in identifying a beginning (and, of course, an
endpoint) of the period of potential exposure. Parenthetically, it
sometimes may assist in quantifying the measure of damages that
may be sought, thus allowing the entity to reserve accordingly.
Furthermore, a limitary span running from a point of discovery
warns potential suitors to be alert. An affirmative burden is placed
on the plaintiff to demarcate a definitive moment when she gained
enough knowledge to enable her to bring suit. This assures that the
plaintiff will do a little work to earn her place in court, while it si-
multaneously punishes lazy parties who procrastinate over commenc-
ing litigation. Apropos to the problem of the slothful plaintiff, the
additional matter of establishing when the suitor should have discov-
ered the purported injury layers another protection upon the defend-
ant. Plaintiffs are thereby compelled to be nimble as well as
intelligent, and defendants take comfort in knowing that some con-
structive duty is imposed as a control over prospective litigants.
The other branch of the trail takes us to the issue of a period of
repose. More than the limitary statute discussed above, a provision
for repose provides an absolute limit on the time to sue. Beyond its
expiration, a suit cannot be maintained. This is just as essential, if
not more so, says the business community, because every prospective
defendant must know without doubt that the danger of litigation is
past and gone forever. Harking to the other old adage that "there
must be an end to litigation," proponents of a statute of repose point
to the inherent limitations of a limitation statute attuned solely to
the event of discovery.
Conceivably, they argue, even in the best of circumstances, the
time of discovery could be years far beyond the purported violation.
And if nothing else, enormous expenditures could be made merely
litigating the issue of the proper time for discovery of the alleged
fraud. A statute of repose, proponents contend, solves that problem.
By proscribing an immutable limit of time, arduous debate over the
discovery date may be avoided. More importantly, given a period of
repose, businesses could take stock of the event giving rise to the liti-
gation risk, and mark off the calendar from there, adjudging the bur-
den of the assumed risk accordingly.
At the end of the day, the arguments of the business community
for statutes of limitation and repose for section 10(b) lawsuits boil
down to one thing: the fact that business needs ands demands a le-
gally enforceable standard by which to measure the time the business
community is exposed to the risk of litigation over matters regarding
federal securities laws. Knowing when and for how long it shall be
at risk is the only way a business can allocate its resources in self-
defense. And since it cannot forever continue in a siege mentality, an
enterprise, in order to prosper, nay, even to survive, must know
when the danger has passed. Anything else would surely choke the
life out of any commercial entity, no matter its size.
Given the litigious nature of modem America, the business com-
munity only seeks protection in order to maintain some semblance of
order. Indeed, it is inarguable that business asks for something that
is nothing more than inherently fair and just.
WHAT CHANGE To BE WROUGHT?
In sum, there we have all the many urgent needs of each side on
the question of an appropriate limitary period for section 10(b) litiga-
tion. To solve this puzzle wrapped in an enigma, a court or legisla-
ture would have to use profound wisdom indeed to select a time span
that finely balances the myriad of considerations as exposited herein-
above. Certainly, they would not lack for a multitude of choices in
[Vol. 19: 485, 1992] Securities Fraud Statute of Limitations
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
arriving at a decision. 24 1
However, the salient point is that, no matter how painstakingly
thoughtful the process is, the ultimate end is a somewhat arbitrary
selection of an appropriate statute of repose. Parsing a limitary span
between, say, a three or four year period, is inherently tinged with
subjectivity. Since this exercise does not necessarily lend itself to
principled decisionmaking, it is a choice best arrived at by consensus.
In that regard, such interstitial lawmaking is best left to the popular
representatives of the citizenry, and any hint of judicial legislation is
to be scrupulously avoided.
That is not to say the Supreme Court commenced from an im-
proper premise in promulgating the one-year/three-year rule.
Rather, the high Court promoted justice by embracing a uniform
rule, and chose the one-and-three limitation from elsewhere in the
federal securities code. The Court acted with the best of intentions,
to be certain. What is left for debate is whether it made the best pos-
sible choice.
Many of the available options discussed at one time or another are
drawn from pre-existing law, borrowed primarily from state statutes
of limitation. Still in play, notwithstanding its rejection by the appel-
late tribunals and Lampf, is the five-year statute of limitations bor-
rowed from the insider trading sanctions. The aforediscussed
opinions viewed that lengthy span as essentially flawed for purposes
of the section 10(b) discussion. Perceiving the statute as exclusively
targeted to correct the heinous act of trading on non-public informa-
tion, the courts believed its limitary period was extended because of
the precise need to address this criminal act.
The foregoing reasoning does have some merit. However, it ne-
glects to account for the similarity, often exceedingly close in certain
cases, between insider trading and securities fraud. Lawsuits often
proceed on these parallel tracks, sometimes converging on the allega-
tions, particularly as to the conduct in issue. Inarguably, section
10(b) actions and insider trading cases are not the same. Neverthe-
less, the shared attributes of the two justify paying greater heed to
the propriety of the five-year limitation.
241. Past proposals have suggested a one-year from constructive discovery/five-year
absolute period of repose, while another suggests a two-year from discovery/six years
from the fraudulent act standard (based on New York law). Moreover, reformists sug-
gest the abandonment of equitable tolling in favor of inflexible termination dates. See
Committee on Federal Regulations of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Statue of
Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 BUSINEss LAWYER 645, 656-57 (1986).
Next is the matter of the recent enactment of the general federal
four-year statute of limitations. The merits and demerits of that pro-
vision have already been discussed at length infra. While there is no
need to repeat those points here, the bottom line is that the existence
of this statute should have some input into the selection process.
Like the five-year insider trading limitation period, it does represent
a recent codification of legislative will. As such, it deserves some-
thing more than the cursory treatment accorded it in Lampf.
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Wholly acknowledging the unavoidably arbitrary nature of any se-
lection, this writer advocates a reformation of the new uniform limi-
tary role to a two-years-from-discovery/four-years-from-the-violation
period of repose. Upon weighing the many competing interests de-
tailed hereinabove, it is believed that such a timeframe represents
the fairest compromise of the varying demands of those antagonistic
forces, balancing the relative harms and benefits to each in just
proportion.
Taking first the statute of limitations running from discovery, it is
submitted here that the present one-year period is woefully short.
The good faith and investigative demands of Rule 11 and the pleading
of securities fraud with particularly requirement of Rule 9(b) place
dual burdens upon a prospective plaintiff, who is already tasked with
uncovering what is usually a complicated and well-concealed fraud in
the first place. A slight extension of the rule to two years from the
date of discovery provides greater equity to the hapless investor,
while not demonstrably undercutting the prospective defendant's
right to fair treatment. To be sure, the latter still retains in its arse-
nal the aforementioned procedural devices as a means of deterring
spurious lawsuits.
Having advocated the addition of a year to the first leg of the new
uniform rule, this commentator likewise advises that the period of
repose should be extended for an identical twelve month period,
bringing the second half of the rule to limiting the commencement of
actions to within four years from the date of the violation. However,
the rationale here is not pro-plaintiff; rather, it truly is pro-defend-
ant, as it represents a superior choice over even the lengthier periods
that have been proposed.
To be sure, the plain and simple fact is that this writing suggests
the present three-year period of repose be transformed to a four-year
span. While obviously longer than the newly adopted rule of Lampf,
it is, more importantly, shorter than the six-year statute of repose
found in some states, and less than the insider trading limitary period
of five years. Because the five-year period co-exists alongside section
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10(b) within the 1934 Act, it bears greater mention here than the ex-
plicit rejection afforded it by the courts.
Certainly, it is undeniable that many similarities exist between an-
tifraud litigation and insider trading cases. Yet a call to equalize the
limitary periods for the two causes of action is ameliorated by their
differences, specifically that the sanctionable conduct of trading on
non-public information was the ground zero of Congress' attack in
enacting the insider trading prohibition. The conclusion to be drawn
is that the five-year statute of repose represents the outer limit of
time in such matters, and a limitary period for section 10(b) should
approach, but not equal, that span. As the four-year period of repose
accomplishes precisely that, its adoption is urged herein.
Lastly, one additional reason exists for adopting four years as the
appropriate statute of repose for securities antifraud cases. It is re-
spectfully submitted that the high Court erred in the short shrift it
gave to the recently enacted four-year general statute of limitations
for federal actions. To be sure, Congress enacted this long awaited
provision in order to avoid the conundrum of interstitial lawmaking
that the federal judiciary has long confronted. Additionally, by its
own terms the! new statute is inapplicable to existing controversies,
such as that surrounding section 10(b). Nevertheless, it is the most
recent expression of legislative will on the limitations issue and has
great value here in that respect. Moreover, its chosen timeframe rep-
resents an allocation that, if applied to antifraud litigation, eases the
burden of besieged defendants, while still maintaining adequate fair-
ness to plaintiffs.
For all of these reasons, this article concludes that the one-year/
three-year limitary period selected in Lampf is not the best-suited pe-
riod of repose for section 10(b). In its place, a two-year/four-year
statute of limitation is proposed for enactment, such spans of time
representing a more equitable resolution of the conflicting tensions
that exist between plaintiffs and defendants in securities antifraud
litigation.
RETROACTIVITY AND LAMPF-BACK TO THE FUTURE?
While most members of the bench and the securities bar agree at
the least that the uniform one-year/three-year limitary rule provides
some stability to an otherwise unpredictable area, the next issue
looming darkly on the horizon is the question of the retroactive ap-
plication, if any, of the new uniform federal limitation. Here the
coming storm could prove to have a great destructive impact on a
broad scale. To be sure, the thoughts of the Supreme Court have not
yet coalesced on this issue, making it even more fraught with peril.
The Principles of Retroactivity
Before examining the specifics of the instant question, a review of
the tests for retroactivity as established by the high Court is essen-
tial. The general rule is that a controversy is to be decided on the
law as it exists when the appellate court decides it.242 Whether a rul-
ing shall apply only prospectively depends upon a weighing of the
"merits and demerits" in each case by examining the rule at issue, its
purpose and effect, and "whether retrospective operation will further
or retard its operation." 24 3 Indeed, "short of a bar of res judicata or
statute of limitations, courts should apply the prevailing decisional
rule to the cases before them."244
The litmus test was postulated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,245
where the Court was asked to determine whether its own decision in
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,2 which adopted state law
instead of federal common law as the basis for computing the limita-
tions period for claims under the Lands Act, should be applied retro-
actively, or prospectively only. The Chevron Court cited three
factors to consider in deciding whether to choose prospective
application:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new princi-
ple of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may
have relied .... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution
was not clearly foreshadowed .... Second, it has been stressed that "we must
... weight the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history
of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective oper-
ation will further or retard its operation." ... Finally, we have weighted the
inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "where a decision of this
Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively,
there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a
holding of nonretroactivity.1'
2 4 7
In that case, the Court elected not to apply the new rule retroactively
when to do so would have barred the plaintiff's claim.
More recently, the Court applied the same principles in two cases,
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazrji,24 and Goodman v. Lukens Steel
242. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486 n.16 (1981) (citing
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969)).
243. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
244. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 295-97 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
245. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
246. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
247. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
248. 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
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Co. ,249 with differing results. In St. Francis College, the Court upheld
the Third Circuit's decision to apply prospectively only a newly
adopted and shorter statute of limitations for cases arising under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The Court reasoned that the new rule overruled
clearly established precedent upon which the plaintiff there was enti-
tled to rely, that retroactive applications would deserve the remedial
purpose of the underlying statute, and that barring plaintiff's claim
by a retroactively applied rule would be "manifestly inequitable." 250
In Goodman, on the other hand, the Court upheld the Third Cir-
cuit's retroactive application of a newly adopted limitations period
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because, prior to the new decision in question,
there had been "no clear precedent on which plaintiffs could have re-
lied."251 Absent such precedent, and the inequity inherent in failing
to follow it, the purposes of repose served by a limitations period
were held to govern.25 2
Prior analyses of the high bench have always shown great distaste
for the inherent unfairness of retroactivity in statutes of limitation
cases. To be sure, a retroactive application of the new limitary period
would be markedly out of step with the Cout's mainstream of hold-
ings. As Justice O'Connor noted with such clarity in Lampf:
Chevron Oil and Saint Francis College are based on fundamental notions of
justified reliance and due process. They reflect a straightforward application
of an earlier line of cases holding that it violates due process to apply a limita-
tions period retroactively and thereby deprive a party arbitrarily of a right to
be heard in court. Not surprisingly, then, the Court's decision in Chevron Oil
and Saint Fraicis College not to apply new limitations periods retroactively
generated no disagreement among members of the Court: the opinion in
Chevron Oil was joined by all but one Justice, who did not reach the retroac-
tivity question; Saint Francis College was unanimous. 2 5 3
Furthermore, the Justice pointed out that only recently "eight Jus-
tices reaffirmed the common-sense rule that decisions specifying the
applicable statute of limitations apply only prospectively" in Ameri-
can Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith.254 While the actual ques-
tion there was the retroactive application of a prior Court decision
striking down a state taxation scheme, the plurality opinion analo-
gized to limitation statute controversies by confirming that "[w]here
249. 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
250. St. Francis College, 481 U.S. at 608-09.
251. Goodman, 482 U.S. at 662.
252. Id. at 663-64.
253. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2786-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
254. 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and
Kennedy, J.)
a litigant filed a claim that would have been timely under the prior
limitation period, the Court has held that the new statute of limita-
tion would not bar his suit."255
Adhering to Chevron, Justice O'Connor said the nonretroactivity
doctrine demands consideration of the equities and gives "great
weight to the reliance interests" of all parties affected.2s6 The Court
went on to find that the "harsh and disruptive effect[s] upon parties
who relied on prior law compelled prospective application only." Ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, "If the operative conduct or events oc-
curred before the law-changing decision, a court should apply the law
prevailing at the time of the conduct. If the operative conduct or
events occurred after the decision, so that any reliance on old prece-
dent would be unjustified, a court should apply the new law."257 To
be sure, the plurality saw no reason to abandon the foregoing princi-
ples, as embodied in Chevron,258 and rejected the dissent's "proposal
that we sub silentio overrule Chevron Oil."259
Even within the American Trucking dissent, continued support for
Chevron and its progeny came to the fore. Justice Stevens, in a dis-
senting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
recognized the Court has "declined to give 'retroactive effect' to deci-
sions announcing 'new' rules of law."260 Those cases typically arise
from statute of limitations controversies,261 "an area over which the
federal courts historically have asserted equitable discretion," a dis-
cretion which implicitly includes the power to refuse to apply a law
retroactively.262 Chevron, St. Francis College, and others establish "a
principle particular to the exercise of [that] equitable discretion." 263
Pausing at this juncture, it is clear that Chevron still represents the
dominant theory of the Supreme Court on retroactivity/prospectivity
issues. American Trucking is merely the latest in a string of high
Court reaffirmations of the former's statement of principle. Notably,
the constituency of the opinions, especially the recent American
Trucking, demonstrates that a solid block of the Justices are aligned
in favor of Chevron's continued viability, with Justice O'Connor play-
ing a pivotal leadership role once again. At the end of day, the ines-
capable conclusion is that Chevron still rules.
255. American Trucking, 110 S. Ct. at 2339.
256. Id at 2334.
257. Id.
258. Id at 2342-43.
259. Id at 2337.
260. Id at 2347 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
263. Id at 2355 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 19: 485, 1992] Securities Fraud Statute of Limitations
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
RETROACTIVITY AND CERES-A PROSPECTIVE VIEW
Once again, the wisdom of the Second Circuit, the matriarch of our
federal securities case law, is most illuminating on this controversy.
As aforestated, Ceres explicitly left the retroactivity question for an-
other day. That day came a few months later in Welch v. Cadre
Capital.264
Circuit Judge Newman posited the issue squarely before the panel
as "whether the new limitations rule of Ceres should be applied ret-
roactively, an issue Ceres did not resolve."265 The Second Circuit
concluded the instant case fell within "the exception to the general
practice of applying new judicial decisions retroactively."266
Looking to the three-part test promulgated by the Supreme Court
in Chevron,28 7 the tribunal acknowledged a narrow exception in civil
actions to the general presumption favoring the application of the
law as it stands when the appeal is heard. Outlining the test, the cir-
cuit court stated that to qualify for prospective use only, a new prece-
dent must first establish a new rule of law, either by overturning
existing holdings or deciding an issue of first impression. Next,
weighing on a case-by-case basis must be made as to whether retroac-
tive application would conflict with the goals of the new holding. Fi-
nally, the Court must determine whether unfair results would obtain
from such retroactive application.268 To be sure, the Welch tribunal
made it clear that the Second Circuit applies the test consecutively,
in that the proponent of prospective application only must satisfy
fully the first prong at the outset. Only then do the balancing tests
of the second and third factors come into consideration. In other
words, complete satisfaction of the fist factor is mandatory, while the
other two requirements may be balanced.269
Turning to the first prong, that of overruling existing precedent,
the panel found the new uniform one-year/three-year rule met the
264. 923 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded sub. nom., Northwest Sav-
ings Bank, PaSA v. Welch, 111 S.Ct. 2882, 2882-83 (1991).
265. Welch, 923 F.2d at 990.
266. Id. at 991.
267. Id. at 993.
268. Id. In consecutive footnotes, the panel found it "worth emphasizing" that the
first prong of the Chevron test requires only the existence of a prior rule that the
plaintiffs "may" have relied upon. Actual reliance is not the benchmark, continued
the court. Id. at 993 n.5. Next, the panel questioned whether Chevron even "retains
validity" for retroactivity disputes "outside the context of statutes of limitation." Id. at
993 n.6, citing American Trucking.
269. Welch, 923 F.2d at 994 (citations omitted).
threshold requirement for nonretroactive application. Since the
fresh mandate changed the established practice, which was clear at
the time this lawsuit was commenced, and since the revision of the
limitary period was not so obviously foreshadowed that plaintiffs
would have no trouble with its determinations, the first hurdle for
nonretroactive application was cleared.270
Judge Newman then reviewed the second Chevron factor - the ef-
fect of retroactive application upon the rule in issue. This was "more
problematical." 271 The tribunal opined:
In the pending case, the application of a new and shorter limitations period
(one year after discovery of the fraud) cannot affect the conduct of the plain-
tiffs where the new rule is announced after expiration of that period. As with
all statutes of repose, the one-year/three-year limitations period advances the
remedial and deterrent purposes of the particular cause of action and pre-
serves the defendant's interest in repose by simultaneously giving notice to
potential plaintiffs of the time within which suit must commence and to po-
tential defendants of the time beyond which exposure to liability ceases. Be-
cause they serve primarily individual, rather than institutional, interests and
do so by giving potential litigants prior notice of their rights, application of a
limitations period not yet in existence at the time suit was commenced clearly
does not further either of the competing interests.
2 7 2
This inquiry satisfied the second test in favor of prospective appli-
cation for the new uniform rule. Indeed, the circuit panel concluded
that the objectives of the federal securities laws "will not be impaired
by continuation of a handful of lawsuits filed within the longer time
limits of previously applicable state law."273
Lastly, according to the circuit court, the equity test embodied in
the third prong of Chevron favors these plaintiffs. The Court found
that the complaining parties had acted property in view of the de-
fendants' allegedly active concealment of the fraud. The court saw
no reason to fault the plaintiffs for making use of the then-control-
ling state limitary period to determine whether they had grounds for
suit. Accordingly, retroactive application of the rule in Ceres would
deny the plaintiffs their day in court, and the Second Circuit refused
to allow such a draconian result.27 4 At that point, the holdings of the
Second Circuit permitted only prospective application of the one-
year/three year rule of Ceres, and hence Lampf.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id at 995.
273. Id.
274. Id., followed by Levine v. NL Industries, Inc., 926 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 1991)
("As in Welch, we decline to give Ceres retroactive application here."). See also Finkel
v. The Stratton Corp., 754 F. Supp. 318, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("It would be inequitable
to apply Ceres retroactively so as to transform an action timely when filed into one
barred forever by the statute of limitations.").
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MIXED SIGNALS FROM THE DATA ACCESS COURT
In counterpoise to Welch, the Third Circuit, champion of the one-
year/three-year rule in Data Access, applied its decision retroactively.
However, there the salient point was evidence of a preordained out-
come, as application of the new limitary period changed nothing.
In Hill v. The Equitable Trust Co.,275 Circuit Judge Weis empha-
sized that, at the trial below, the jury found the plaintiffs were aware
of the alleged fraud nearly three years before they filed suit.276 Since
the Data Access limitations period was "identical" to the state provi-
sion applied by the district judge, the "plaintiffs fare the same."277
Under both scenarios, their unexplained delay rendered the lawsuit
untimely.278 So while the Third Circuit did conduct the full range of
analysis mandated by Supreme Court precedent, and purported to ap-
ply the one-yeAr/three-year rule retroactively, in truth the Hill deci-
sion is not dispositive, for its result was unchanged. Therefore, Hill
does not stand as a true measure of the propriety of the retroactive
application of Data Access, but merely indicates the willingness of the
Third Circuit to apply the rule retroactively.
Moreover, one must also look to the dissenting opinion filed in
Data Access itself. Writing for the contrarias on the en banc panel,
Circuit Judge Seitz, joined by Judges Sloviter and Mansmann, be-
lieved "the majority commit[ted] egregious error in not addressing
and resolving" the retroactivity question.2 79
Convinced that the issue of retroactive application must be ad-
dressed in deciding if the Third Circuit's new limitary rule should be
imposed on the litigants before it, Judge Seitz commenced his analy-
sis from "the established legal principle that this court has the power
to apply a rule of law prospectively only." As could be expected, the
dissent relied almost exclusively on the Chevron analysis, and had no
doubt that the principles therein applied fully here.28 0
275. 851 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1988).
276. Id at 697.
277. Id. at 698.
278. Id This was the last point made by the panel in favor of retroactive applica-
tion, as taken from the third Chevron criterion, the prevention of inequitable results.
Id. To be sure, the tribunal first found that the plaintiffs could not have reasonably
relied on any prior ruling of the court because the law of the Third Circuit was "uncer-
tain," "in ferment," and "less settled," thus overcoming the initial prong of Chevron.
Id at 697-98. The tsecond-whether retroactively would further or retard the rule's
function-was "neutral." Id
279. Data Access, 843 F.2d 1537, 1551 (3rd. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Seitz, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 1552.
That test, opined the dissenters, "mandates that the rule an-
nounced today not be applied to this case." Apparently key to this
position was the concern that a prospective application of the new
limitary period "[would] preserve the plaintiffs' opportunity to have a
day in court," while a retroactive administration of the holding would
"foreclose that opportunity." 28'
The divergence and uncertainty in the Third Circuit on the retro-
activity issue is best exemplified in Gruber v. Price Waterhouse.28 2
Notably, the opinion of the unanimous panel was written by Circuit
Judge Mansmann, one of the dissenters on the retroactivity question
in Data Access.283 Presented with a certified question as to the retro-
active or prospective application of the one-year/three-year rule, the
tribunal relied upon Chevron to find that the Data Access rule should
apply prospectively here.2s4
Acknowledging that the Third Circuit had applied the new limi-
tary rule retroactively in Hill and elsewhere,28 5 the panel empha-
sized, "the determination of retroactivity vel non involves a balancing
which must be done on a case by case basis."286 That task, wrote
Judge Mansmann, must be performed in accordance with Chevron. 287
In brief, the Gruber court found that the first and third compo-
nents of Chevron mandated prospective application of Data Access,
whereas the second prong of Chevron was neutral here.2 8 8 For that
reason, the Third Circuit refused to apply the one-year/three-year
rule retroactively to these litigants.28 9
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which had followed
Data Access in charting this new limitations ground, parted company
with its sister circuit on the issue of retroactivity. In Robin v. Arthur
Young & Co.,290 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant accounting
281. Id. at 1553.
282. 911 F.2d 960-61 (3d Cir. 1990).
283. Id. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1537.
284. Gruber, 911 F.2d at 961.
285. Id. sit 964. See McCarter v. Mitcham, 883 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1989); Gatto v. Meri-
dan Medical Assoc., Inc., 882 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1989).
286. Gruber, 911 F.2d at 965.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 968.
289. Id. at 969. See K.B. Equities, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 764 F. Supp. 1005, 1006
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (Ditter, J.) (refusing to apply Data Access retroactively, but neverthe-
less dismissing the action as time-barred under the forum's common law statute of lim-
itations of two years). For retroactive application cases, see McCarter v. Mitcham, 883
F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1989); Gatto, 882 F.2d 840 (3rd. Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1080,
(1990); Panna v. Firstrust Savings Bank, 749 F. Supp. 1372 (D.N.J. 1990). Compare In
re National Smelting of New Jersey, 722 F. Supp. 152, 160 (D.N.J. 1989) (Data Access
not applied retroactively).
290. 915 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1990). The Seventh Circuit did not reach the retroactiv-
ity question in several other cases. See generally Radiology Center v. Stifel, Nicolaus
& Co., 919 F.2d 1216, 1217 (7th Cir. 1990); Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v.
Runnfeldt Inv. Co., 910 F.2d 1540, 1544 (7th Cir. 1990).
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firm was guilty of aiding and abetting section 10(b) violations. Be-
cause the plain-tiffs failed to properly state such a claim, however, the
appellate court dismissed the action, and explicitly did not reach the
question of whether it should apply retroactively its own decision in
Short to adopt a one-year/three-year limitary period for antifraud ac-
tions.291 Clearly then, the Seventh Circuit is at worst neutral, and, at
best, indicates an unwillingness to apply its new limitations rule
retroactively.
Reviewing the foregoing appellate cases, it is evident that the same
tribunals which formed the critical nucleus of support for the uni-
form one-year/three-year rule are in disharmony over its application.
The Seventh Circuit has not addressed the issue, but has implicitly
avoided a retroactive application of the rule. The Second Circuit ad-
vocates prospectivity only, while the rule's originator, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, wears the two faces of Janus in simul-
- 291. Robin, 915 F.2d at 1122-23. See Reshal Associates, Inc. v. Long Grove Trading
Co., 754 F. Supp. 1226, 1241 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (Rovner, J.) ("Because all three of the
Chevron factors are satisfied, the Short holding shall be applied prospectively only.").
See Kayne v. PaineWebber Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1334, 1343-44 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (Duff, J.)
(refusing to apply Data Access retroactively). Compare In re VMS Sec. Litig., 752 F.
Supp. 1373, 1383-88 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (Conlon, J.) (applying Short retroactively where
section 10(b) claims were accompanied by other securities law causes of action clearly
controlled by one-year/three-year statutory limitary periods).
In addition, Polansky V. PaineWebber Inc., 762 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ill. 1991), is singu-
lar in its hairpin twists and turns to apply the one-year/three-year limitary rule retro-
actively in a non-retroactive scenario. In moving for dismissal, the defendant argued
that retroactivity was not an issue because the Seventh Circuit had decided Short "al-
most four months before the plaintiff filed his complaint." Id at 770. As point in fact,
District Judge Duff repeatedly and explicitly pointed out that the plaintiff had suffi-
cient time to discover the appellate holding and still file his complaint on a timely ba-
sis. L at 770-72, nn.3-4.
Nevertheless, the district court insisted retroactive application of the uniform limi-
tary period at issue, and proceeded to make a Chevron analysis. Judge Duff, to his
credit, unequivocally held against the procrastinating plaintiff on each of the three
Chevron factors. Id at 770-72. Declaring that "[t]he plaintiff cannot have his cake and
eat it, too," Id. at 771, the court made its most stinging criticism in analyzing the last
two Chevron factors, those of uniformity and fairness, by stating.
Allowing the plaintiff to pursue this action nearly four months after the sev-
enth circuit decided Short, would undermine the goals of uniformity and cer-
tainty.... How many months can a plaintiff wait after this decision and still
expect prospective treatment?
Again the plaintiff can not avoid the fact that he field his action nearly four
months after the Short decision.... There is no inequity in applying a deci-
sion to a complaint that was filed more than three months after the decision
was decided.
Id, at 772. As observed by District Judge Rovner in Reshal Assoc., supra, "The retroac-
tivity issue has itself spawned a cottage industry of litigation particularly in the Third
Circuit." 754 F. Supp. at 1239 n.1.
taneously embracing both retroactive and solely prospective applica-
tions. In this author's view, the Second Circuit's reasoning, largely
because of its proper grounding upon the Chevron test, is correct.
Thus, the better view of the circuits favors prospective application
only for the one-year/three-year rule.
JAMES BEAM-DANGER AHEAD
An alarming turn of events occurred just recently when the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded Welch292 for further consider-
ation of the retroactivity issue, in light of Lampf and another new
holding, James B. Beam Distilling Company v. Georgia.293
By remanding Welch with the explicit command that the Second
Circuit reconsider it in light of the Court's most recent rulings on
retroactivity, the Supreme Court introduced into the admixture its
highly controversial ruling in James Beam, as well as a similarly dis-
puted portion of the Lampf holding. To be certain, James Beam
brings to light a pronounced schism on the high bench, a divergence
of opinion that has yet still to draw final lines of opposing forces.
In brief, the case itself pertained to the validity of Georgia's excise
tax on imported liquor. A similar law in Hawaii was struck down as
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in Bacchus Imports,
Ltd. v. Dias.294 The precise question before the Court in James Beam
was whether it should apply Bacchus retroactively. In answering in
the affirmative, the high bench once again fragmented into disjointed
cells of opinion.295
Critical to this analysis is the remarkably short shrift given by Jus-
tice Souter to the oft-cited Chevron analysis. The plurality com-
mences from the point that the Court has, "albeit infrequently,
resorted to pure prospectivity," pursuant to Chevron, in applying a
rule of law.296 Notwithstanding that the parties in James Beam had
assumed Chevron controlled, the Court replied that it has "never em-
292. Welch, 923 F.2d at 990.
293. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
294. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
295. James Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2441. This time, Justice Souter delivered the opinion
and was joined by Justice Stevens. Justices White and Blackmun filed opinions sepa-
rately to concur in the judgment. Justice Scalia joined Justice Blackmun, but never-
theless filed his own opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Blackmun then
joined in Justice Scalia's opinion, and Justice Marshall joined in both the Blackmun
and Scalia concurrences. Justice O'Connor filed the dissenting opinion, and was joined
therein by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. The obvious comparisons to
the Lampf matrix of opinions, need not be agonized over here. Suffice to say, the simi-
larities and differences in composition between the two can lead to endless speculation
as to what the future holds on this issue. Id. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pet-
tigrow v. Gilbert, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
296. James Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2443-44.
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ployed Chevron Oil to the end of modified civil prospectivity."2 97
For this reason, the high bench held that principles of equality and
stare decisis prevail over any claim based on a Chevron analysis. The
equality precept, "that similarly situated litigants should be treated
the same," demands retroactive application where, as done in
Bacchus, the Court applied the rule to the very case that gave birth
to the pronouncement. 298 Retroactivity in civil cases also depends
upon the need for finality, continued Justice Souter. "[O]nce suit is
barred by res judicata or by statutes of limitation or repose, a new
rule cannot reopen the door already closed."29 9
Lastly, the Court disclaimed the notion that litigants are to be dis-
tinguished on the particular equities of their claims to prospectivity.
"It is simply in the nature of precedent," as a component of fairness
and equality, that substantive law shall not "shift and spring on such
a basis."3"0 To some extent, Justice Souter admitted the Court delim-
ited the possible applications of Chevron, however irrelevant Chevron
might otherwise have been to the instant case. Chevron, said the plu-
rality, "cannot determine the choice of law by relying on the equities
of the particular case."301
However, seeming to salvage the Chevron analysis it had only just
maligned, the Court cautioned that "nothing we say here precludes
consideration of individual equities when deciding remedied issues in
particular cases." 302 Declaring this decision to lie on narrow ground,
the Court paradoxically affirmed that a rule of law applied to liti-
gants in one case must be imposed with respect to all others not
barred by procedural requirements or res judicata. In the same
breath, the Court steadfastly refused to "speculate as to the bounds
or propriety of pure prospectivity."303 On that enigmatic note, the
Court's opinion came to a halt.
Justice White concurred in the judgment of the Court, but indeed
clearly joined in the result alone. To be sure, Justice White did not
see the Chevron doctrine implicated, first, because its decision herein
did not create a new or unforeseeable rule in light of Bacchus, and
second, that "the Court may have thought that retroactive applica-
297. Id at 2445.
298. Id, at 2446.
299. Id
300. Id, at 2447.
301. Id
302. Id at 2448.
303. Id
tion was proper" even pursuant to Chevron.304
Paramount was Justice White's declaration that nothing in his con-
curring opinion "[was] meant to suggest that [he] retreat[ed] from
those opinions... holding or recognizing that in proper cases a new
rule announced by the Court will not be applied retroactively." 3 s
Recognizing Chevron and reaffirming his commitment to the decision
in American Trucking, Justice White stated that no one could "sensi-
bly insist on automatic retroactivity for any and all judicial decisions
in the federal system," without first overruling Chevron, its anteced-
ents, and its progeny.306 Indeed, this led Justice White to state his
inability to comprehend why the plurality opinion made references to
the Court's cases on prospective operation, yet claimed it need not
speculate as to pure prospectivity.3 0 7 Justice White in fact closed by
noting he was "unpersuaded by this line of reasoning" in Justice
Scalia's opinion.30 8
Once again, Justice O'Connor found herself a dissenter, but the
clarity and strength of her opinion leads one to believe that the end
of the day has not yet arrived on this issue. Immediately taking the
offensive, Justice O'Connor found the principles of equality and stare
decisis cited by Justice Souter in favor of retroactivity "lend to pre-
cisely the opposite result."3 9
Justice O'Connor noted that the Supreme Court "has refused re-
peatedly to apply new rules retroactively in civil cases." 310 Citing to
American Trucking, Justice O'Connor found "no need to repeat that
discussion here."S11 When the high Court promulgates new law, it
must then determine whether the new law is to apply to controver-
sies occurring before the innovation. Chevron, said the dissent, de-
scribes the procedure for making that inquiry.312
Faulting Bacchus for applying its new rule retroactively without
engaging the Chevron test, Justice O'Connor held that the lack of
that examination in James Beam repeated the same blunder.31 3
Neither equality or stare decisis is served if the Chevron doctrine is
not followed, stated Justice O'Connor.314 Indeed, referring to Justice
Souter's concern for fairness, Justice O'Connor chided the plurality
304. Id. (White, J., concurring).
305. Id at 2449.
306. Id (White, J., concurring).
307. Id (White, J., concurring).
308. Id (White, J., concurring).
309. Id at 2451 (White, J., concurring).
310. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
311. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 110 S.
Ct. 2323, 2327-43 (1990)).
312. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
313. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
314. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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for ignoring the very test vital "to determine the equities of retroac-
tive application of a new rule."315
Likewise, Justice O'Connor criticized the plurality opinion for jus-
tifying its retroactive application by reason of stare decisis:
This is not a proper application of stare decisis. The Court in Bacchus applied
its rule retroactively to the parties before it without any analysis of the issue.
This tells nothing about how this case: where the Chevr Oil question is
squarely presented - should come out.
*S.
At its core, stare deciais allows those affected by the law to order their affairs
without fear that the established law upon which they rely will suddenly be
pulled out from under them. A decision not to apply a new rule retroactively
is based on principles of stare decisis. By not applying a law-changing decision
retroactively, a court respects the settled expectations that have built up
around the old law. 3 1 6
According to Justice O'Connor, under the Chevron analysis, retro-
actively applying the new rule in the instant case "would unjustly
undermine settled expectations." Justice O'Connor further declared
"stare decisis dictates strongly against the Court's holding."317
Justice O'Coanor then expressed grave concern for the future of
the longstanding Chevron analysis. "Justice Souter purports to have
restricted that test only to a limited extent," noted Justice O'Connor,
but she added that the effect "appears to me far greater."3 18 Dis-
agreeing with the plurality, which distinguished between the narrow
issue of retroactivity to parties before the Court from the broader
question of retroactive application to all litigants, the dissent
contended:
But it is precisely in determining general retroactivity that the Chevron Oil
test is most needed; the broader the potential reach out of a new rule, the
greater the potential disruption of settled expectations. The inquiry the Court
summarized in Chevron Oil represents longstanding doctrine or the applica-
tion of nonretroactivity to civil cases. Justice Souter today ignores this well-
established precedent, and seriously curtails the Chevron Oil inquiry. His reli-
ance upon stare decisis in reading this conclusion becomes all the more
ironic.3 1 9
Decrying the fact that the instant decision in James Beam will ulti-
mately burden "blameless and unexpecting citizens ... by imposing
widespread liability on parties having no reason to expect it,"320 the
315. Id. at 2451-452 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated, "The equi-
table analysis of Chevron Oil places limitations on the liability that may be imposed on
unsuspecting parties after this Court changes the law." I. at 2455.
316. I& at 2452 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
317. Idl. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
318. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
319. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
320. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
dissent salvoed its final criticism at the plurality opinion, forcefully
concluding:
This decision is made in the name of "equality" and "stare deciss." By refus-
ing to take into account the settled expectations of those who relied on this
Court's established precedents, the Court's decision perverts the meaning of
both those terms.
32 1
With but a short passage of time having elapsed since James Beam
was decided, it is difficult to say whether that ruling represents an
incidental deviation from the Chevron rule or something more fate-
ful. Whatever James Beam eventually proves to be, for now it would
be very risky indeed to think the Chevron doctrine has been outmo-
ded. The ongoing support Chevron enjoys from the St. Francis Col-
lege, Goodman, and recent American Trucking decisions testifies to
its durability as embodying the controlling doctrine on prospectivity.
Most important, the absence of even a mild consensus in James Beam
makes it unlikely that its viewpoint could withstand another on-
slaught from its critics within the high Court itself. In the end, re-
sort to Chevron is by far the best path.
THE TRIAL COURTS IN TURMOIL
To date, the fallout at the trial level on the matter of retroactivity
is still inconclusive. In Block v. First Blood Assoc.,32 2 District Judge
Sweet operated without the restraints of Lampf and James Beam,
but decided the case under the rubric of the one-year/three-year rule
adopted by the Second Circuit.3 23
To be sure, the plaintiffs' action was at risk from its inception.
Judge Sweet wryly commented that "[o]nce the Ceres issue had
drawn First Blood's attention to the limitations question, it recog-
nized that even under pre-Ceres law there was a question of the time-
liness of the investors' claims."324 As was the practice in the Second
Circuit prior to Ceres, this court, pursuant to the law of the forum,
undertook to borrow statutes of limitation from the plaintiffs' home
states.3 2 5 Notwithstanding a choice of the laws of ten states, the dis-
trict court found the action time-barred under each and every limi-
tary statute from which a New York court might borrow.326
321. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
322. 763 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
323. 918 F.2d 349 (2nd Cir. 1990). As movie fans and hard-boiled litigators alike
might have guessed, the lead defendant was indeed the ownership entity for "First
Blood," the first of action star Sylvester Stallone's film characterizations of "Rambo."
Block v. First Blood Assoc., 743 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). For the record, Mr.
Stallone was not a named defendant. One can only speculate as to the tenor of the
litigation had he been a party. 763 F. Supp. at 747.
324. Block, 763 F. Supp. at 747.
325. Id at 750.
326. Id at 751.
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Alternatively, the court considered whether to apply Ceres retroac-
tively, a determination it found must be made purely on a sui generis
basis.327 With reference to the Chievron inquiry, Judge Sweet found
that the plaintiffs before him failed the reliance prong of that test.328
As the action was untimely even under the formerly prevailing law,
these plaintiffs could not possibly have relied upon the pre-existing
rule. Thus, the court was free to impose the new rule of Ceres.3 29
In conclusion, this district court made a distinction without a dif-
ference. Under the old law of borrowing state limitary periods for
section 10(b) actions, it found the lawsuit time-barred. Applying the
new uniform rule did not change the result. Block neither adds nor
subtracts to the equation of retroactivity.330
327. Id
328. Id In a footnote, the Court pointed out that plaintiffs "have at least tacitly ad-
mitted that they relied on a mistaken belief that New York's statue of limitations pe-
riod applied to their claims." Id at 752 n.4.
329. Id at 752.
330. In Glick v. Berk & Michaels, P.C., 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. [CCH] 96,134 at 90, 746
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), District Judge Haight refused to apply the one-year/three-year rule
retroactively, declaring that Lampf "expressly left open the question of whether [it]
applied retroactively." Id. at 90, 748 n.6. Compare Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) P. 96, 121. No. 90 Civ. 5610 slip op. (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1991) (Kee-
nan, J.) After the defendant accounting firm moved to dismiss on the basis of Lampf,
the plaintiffs sent a letter to the court stating that "although we will not voluntarily
dismiss such [section 10(b) claims, we will not oppose defendant's brief to dismiss on
the grounds of the statute of limitations." Slip op. at 2. Given such an utter lack of
opposition, what real choice did Judge Keenan have but to grant the motion? Truly,
Duke is a non-event, with no import on the retroactivity issue. See also Brumbaugh v.
Princeton Partners, 766 F. Supp 497, (S.D.W.Va. 1991). Less than two weeks after
Lampf was issued, Chief Judge Haden dismissed a section 10(b) claim as untimely
under the new one-year/three-year rule. Id. at 500. Simultaneously, a state "blue sky"
cause was also time-barred, pursuant to the West Virginia law imposing a three-year
statute of repose on such actions. Id at 499-500. Given the identity of the forum's pe-
riod of repose to that of Lampf, it cannot be said that the Supreme Court's rule was
dispositive in this case either.
Likewise, the cursory references to retroactivity found in Haggerty v. Comstock
Gold Co., L.P., 770 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), are meaningless to this discussion.
There, the precise controversy before District Judge Leisure was a motion for reargu-
ment of an order entered on May 29, 1991. In that decision, the court dismissed the
federal securities fraud causes of action, but "found it unnecessary to consider the
Moving Defendants' argument that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations."
Id at 218 n.3 (emphasis supplied). Indeed, the plaintiffs did "not seek reargument of
that part of the May 29 Order." Id See also Barr v. McGraw-Hill, 770 F. Supp. 855
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Conboy, J.) (dismissing section 10(b) claims as time-barred, and "con-
clud[ing] that the use of a Chevron analysis here would be inappropriate and imper-
missible," in light of "the fact the Supreme Court, without any consideration of the
Chevron factors, applied its new rule to the litigants in Lampf"). See Haggerty v. Corn-
stock Gold Co., 765 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (the May 29th order).
THE PORTENTS OF LAMPF AND JAMES BEAM
If one were to momentarily take a quite narrow view of the retro-
activity of the new one-year/three-year rule, as guided by the deci-
sions in Lampf and James Beam and the remand of Welch in light of
the former two rulings, one would probably conclude that the retro-
active application of the new uniform limitary period is a virtual cer-
tainty. However, this writer submits that such a vision would be not
seeing the forest for the trees. Indeed, the strident voices heard in
both of the aforementioned decisions of the Supreme Court lend
great credibility, if not probability, to the belief that the rule of
Lampf will be adjudged to apply prospectively only.
Consider first, that to presently justify a retroactive application of
the one-year/three-year standard, reliance would have to straddle the
pluralities of Lampf and James Beam. No mean feat that, as the
hotly contested rationalizations of each provide only treacherous
ground underfoot. Even combined, the very protestations raised in
the concurring opinions, let alone the dissents, do not make the slope
any less slippery.
Turning to Lampf, the plurality of Justice Blackmun inflicts the
most damage unto itself, by way of its vague and almost passing ref-
erence to its retrofitted application. Moreover, it can even be fairly
said that the retroactive application of the new rule emerges from
Lampf primarily by implication, and not by cogent legal analysis.
Taking this a bit further, one might even respectfully ponder if the
application of the new rule to the parties before it was a mere hap-
penstance, as opposed to a well-reasoned choice to bring the new
edict to life in the instant proceeding.
James Beam adds no strength to the proponents of retroactivity;
the weaknesses inherent in the plurality opinion cause only more dis-
comfiture, not less. Justice Souter's opinion, while theoretically in-
triguing, seems to be misplaced. Although its thesis is not necessarily
incorrect, it lacks the focus of other high Court pronouncements on
the subject. Its effect, if any, on the general doctrine of retroactivity
vis-&-vis prospectivity, is not discernible. To be sure, it apparently
proceeds on a tangent away from Chevron, yet it does not overrule
that longstanding landmark. While James Beam seems to be a varia-
tion of Chevron, it would seem hasty and unwise to pull the shroud
over the remains of a supposedly defunct Chevron.331
331. Indeed, Justice Souter has drawn significant criticism for his authorship of the
plurality opinion in James Beam. In a recent issue of the ABA Journal, noted legal
commentator Bruce Fein mercilessly excoriated the Justice, considering James Beam
as "betray[ing] a mundane and sluggish mind that frequently pivots on maverick facts
and deprives cases of precedential significance." Bruce Fein, A Court of Mediocrities,
77 A.B.A. J. 74, 78 (October, 1991). Mr. Fein continued his attack by stating:
Souter was just as timid about clarifying whether the remedy for a constitu-
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Lastly, James Beam suffers, as does Lampf, from sheer lack of con-
sensus. James Beam is most at risk here, as Justices Souter and Ste-
vens stand alone. The O'Connor dissent therein places that Justice,
the Chief Justice, and Justice Kennedy toe-to-toe against the plural-
ity on the retroactivity question.3 32 Little else can be added here,
given the analysis made ante. Suffice to say these'dissenters shall not
yield on retroactivity without a titanic battle. Likewise, Justice
White made it perfectly clear that he would not give ground on the
validity of Chevron or its progeny.33 3 He, too, is clearly an advocate
of prospective application only in such cases. The other Justices,
while caught between the lines in James Beam, would not necessarily
be so ambivalent in the next confrontation. It would seem they
found little of appeal in the plurality's writing, leaving them just as
likely to ally themselves with the advocates championing prospective
application only for the new uniform limitary rule.334
Indeed, such a notion finds its strongest support in nothing less
than the Lampf decision itself. Once again, Justice O'Connor derided
the prevailing opinion for what she viewed as an aberrational imposi-
tion of the new rule.335 Justice Kennedy joined his colleague, while
Justice Scalia maintained his independence, and ergo his seeming
neutrality. 336 Yet while those Justices would seem to constitute a mi-
nority in Lam pf, it is debatable how the full Court, in light of both
the indecisiveness of the Lampf discussion on the issue, and the dis-
sension so readily apparently in James Beam, would decide the retro-
activity question in some future proceedings.
If Lampf were to be applied in the manner seemingly intended by
the plurality, then it would appear Justice Kennedy rightly predicted
"the Court's new and unforgiving rule," applied retroactively to
pending actions, would catch defrauded investors in a procedural
snare, while foreclosing to them any means of recovery against per-
tional violation might vary among litigants that benefitted from retroactivity
based on individual equities or the reliance interests of the government.
Indeed, he [Justice Souter] conspicuously advertised to lower courts the incon-
sequential] teaching of James Beam ...
In sum, Beam added virtually nothing to the store of constitutional knowledge
governing civil retroactivity questions that bedevil the judiciary.
Id. at 78-79.
332. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 293-96 and accompanying text.
334. See id.
335. See supra notes 200-11 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 190-200 and accompanying text.
petrators of securities frauds.3 3 7
THE BETTER RULE OF CHEVRON
Up to this point, we have examined the intrinsic unreliability of
the retroactivity analyses employed in Lampf and James Beam. In
contrast stand the very positive arguments in favor of solely prospec-
tive application for the new one-year/three-year limitary period. Our
analysis begins, of course, with Chevron. Clearly, the majority of
voices heard in James Beam, including that of the plurality, tell us
that the Justices have not jettisoned the Chevron doctrine. For that
reason, its edict must still be obeyed.
That was the explicit verdict of the Second Circuit applying Lampf
only prospectively in Welch.338 The Seventh Circuit's hesitancy to
decide the issue in Short3 39 implies a similar view. While the Third
Circuit lacks clear direction either for or against prospectivity, it
must be noted that where its panels made a retroactive application of
the one-year/three-year rule, other mitigating factors came into play,
and provided an alternative basis for the same result.340 To date, the
decisions of the trial courts have followed in that vein. As we have
seen, even where district judges have dismissed actions as untimely
pursuant to Lampf, the rationale employed generally finds equal if
not firmer footing in something other than a retroactive application
of the one-year/three-year rule.
Adherence to Chevron is not burdensome in any event. Few would
argue against the proposition that Chevron represents a well-rea-
soned standard that leads to principled decisionmaking. Little more
can be asked of a doctrine with such conclusive impact on the sensi-
tive question of the timeliness of a specific action.
To be sure, the viability of Chevron has often been reaffirmed by
the high Court, as evinced most recently by American Trucking.341
Indeed, notwithstanding the modified analysis introduced by Justice
Souter in James Beam, Chevron remains largely unscathed. Courts
should thus feel unrestrained in applying the Chevron test to the ret-
roactivity question for limiting the time in which to commence sec-
tion 10(b) actions.
Thus in conforming the new uniform statute of limitations for se-
curities antifraud actions to the Chevron analysis, this writer con-
tends that the infant rule lands upright and squarely within all the
337. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
338. Welch v. Cadre Capital, 923 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1991).
339. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 2887 (1991).
340. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 254-65 and accompanying text.
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requirements of the high Court's precedents for prospective applica-
tion only. The one-year/three-year mandate represents an innova-
tion in the measurement of the timeliness of section 10(b) actions.
While the contours of the new rule were explored at an earlier point
by the circuit triumvirate, the sharp disagreement among the appel-
late courts has led to a marked lack of consensus. By no means was
the one-year/three-year standard all powerful, until the Supreme
Court had the last word. Cast in that light, Lampffor the first time
clearly established a new principle, circumventing the established
protocols of borrowing state statutes of limitation. To be sure, the re-
liance of litigants on the old ways is painfully evident in the post-
Lampf cases, and will became more pronounced as parties and courts
agonize over the retroactivity issue.
Next is the matter of whether retroactive application of the one-
year/three-year edict will further or retard the new rule's operation.
A carefully conservative observer would probably find this factor
neutral, as the courts generally have also found to date. This is prob-
ably the correct, and indeed the more expedient view, as it eliminates
this aspect from the Chevron calculus. However, this commentator
would venture that a retroactive application of Lampf would hinder
the courts, if not the rule itself, as it would undoubtedly engender
protracted and contentious litigation, as plaintiffs attempt to fend off
dismissal motions by forcing the complained of acts into the con-
strained time span the new rule allows. Strict prospective application
would further advance the rule by avoiding the cacophony of diver-
gent opinions that such a fracas would produce.
Lastly, but most significantly, the equities must be weighted. And
here the interests of fairness and justice cry out for prospective appli-
cation only. It is submitted here that Lampf demarcates such a turn-
ing point in the law that it would beyond question work an injustice
and a hardship on parties who relied on its predecessors in bringing
their respective actions. By and large, the reliance of litigants on the
state borrowing doctrine is very acute in section 10(b) cases. The
Court's decree that the borrowing shall henceforth be from an analo-
gous federal provision (one usually shorter than that of the forum)
shatters the rightful expectations of existing plaintiffs. One would be
hard-pressed to imagine a greater injustice than that suffered by a
defrauded investor, who having honestly relied upon the law as it
once was, is then told that the action is time-barred, while the stock
market vandals who caused the injury are left free to attempt to sack
and pillage yet another day. Such hardship should not be visited
upon the hapless suitor, and securities pirates should not have the
good fortune of such a judicial reprieve.
This writer, however, is not turning a deaf ear to the embattled de-
fendants, whose pleas for help have finally been answered by virtue
of the new uniform rule. It seems clear that while a retroactive ap-
plication of Lampf would of course be greatly beneficial to them,
such a windfall is not really necessary to their well-being. That is not
to say that victimized defendants, particularly in the financial com-
munity and its professions, do not deserve such a reward of sweeping
retroactivity; rather, as alluded to earlier herein, as astute business
people they have already made provision for the "litigation risk."
The wise financial professional, accountant or attorney has been
circumspect in analyzing the exposure of antifraud suits, meritorious
or otherwise, and reserved accordingly. Excepting the foolhardy,
they have measured the risk of litigation by standards of pre-existing
law. As a means of discarding troublesome suits, a retroactive appli-
cation of Lampf is a bonus. Having prepared for much worse, de-
fendants will suffer no ill effect from a prospective application only
of the new rule, as compared to a worthy plaintiff totally foreclosed
if retroactivity becomes the order of the day.
In sum, beleaguered defendants do not need a retroactive applica-
tion of Lampf; they may take their greatest comfort by knowing that
the future will be a safer one, as new litigation shall be governed by a
rule that is uniform across the land and prescribes a lesser and more
definitive period of exposure. By thereby decreasing the litigation
risk, the interests of business and finance are well served, and their
smooth, unburdened functioning is assured. For these reasons, the
courts should apply the new uniform limitary period prospectively
only, and measure pending suits by pre-Lampf standards.
THE CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
While the uniform limitary period established in Lampf has been
welcomed for the mere fact that it does now provide for national uni-
formity, the Supreme Court's selection of the one-year from discov-
ery/three-years from the act rule of limitation for securities
antifraud suits has been soundly criticized. Indeed, almost immedi-
ately after the high Court's pronouncement, efforts were launched to
introduce remedial legislation to impart a Congressionally enacted
statute of repose in place of the time span utilized in the Lampf uni-
form rule.3 42
In hearings before the United States Senate, Securities and Ex-
342. See Kevin G. Salwen, "Breeden Calls SEC Supervision of Advisers Poor,"
WALL ST. J., July 26, 1991, at C1.
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change Commission Chairman Richard Breeden endorsed a proposal
for a two-years-from discovery/five-years-after-the-violation statute
of limitation for section 10(b) causes of action?343 Citing the fact that
the intrinsic nature of securities fraud makes detection difficult, and
most likely only after the fraud has collapsed, Chairman Breeden
faulted Lampf as promulgating an "unrealistically short" limitary pe-
riod that would harm the viability of the private lawsuits so essential
to the antifraud statute's enforcement function.34 ' Furthermore,
SEC investigations, IRS tax audits, and other such inquiries, often
the catalyst for exposing the fraud in the first place, frequently take
years to complete. The incompatibility of the new Supreme Court
ruling with the realities of policing securities fraud "will sharply
limit the number of cases that will be brought," contended the
watchdog agency's chairman.345
The proposed bill, now before the Senate Securities Subcommittee,
was introduced by Senator Bryan and co-sponsored by Senator
Riegle, chairman of the full Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
Committee of the upper house.340 The bill would also eliminate the
retroactive application of Lampf, permitting lawsuits now pending to
be abjudged by the two-year/five-year limitary period contemplated
therein.347 Mr. Bryan added that his remedial legislation is indeed
based upon the amicus brief filed by the SEC in Lampf, and that all
implied rights to suit under the federal securities laws would be in-
cluded under the penumbra of the new two-year/five-year rule.348
The bill itself, "The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991,"
calls for the addition of a new section at the end of the codification of
the Securities Exchange Act. The proposed statute provides that
"any private right of action arising from a violation of [the 1934] Act"
be governed by a two-years-from discovery/five-years-from-the viola-
tion limitary nle. "Discovery" is defined as the actual revelation it-
self or when discovery should have occurred "through the exercise of
reasonable diligence." 349
Moreover, if enacted the new provision "shall apply to all proceed-
343. IL
344. ld.
345. Breeden Endorses Bill to Reverse Decision on § 10(b) Limitations Period, 23





ings pending on or commenced after June 19, 1991."350 As for its ef-
fect on dismissed causes of action, the proposed amendment
explicitly commands that for any cause of action 1) "dismissed as
time-barred subsequent to June 19, 1991," 2) which would have been
timely filed under applicable law on that date, the day before Lampf
was decided, and 3) which would have been timely under this new
two-year/five-year statutory rule, "may be refiled within 60 days
from the date of enactment" of this law.3 51
When introducing his proposal, Senator Bryan criticized Lampf as
borrowing "arbitrary time limits" from elsewhere in the securities
law, time periods that "simply do not reflect the complexity and im-
portance" of antifraud cases.3 5 2 "Even more alarmingly," said the
Senator, it appears that the Court's decision will apply retroactively,
nullifying thousands of section 10(b) securities fraud cases currently
underway, "cases filed in a timely manner in good faith reliance on
the then existing rule."3 5 3
Beckoning the Congress "to step forward and make these policy
determinations," Mr. Bryan pointed out that "perpetrators of securi-
ties fraud can go undetected for years, and will not be exposed until
their fraudulent investment schemes ultimately collapse ....
[P]utting the pieces ... together to form the basis for a lawsuit can
take an enormous amount of time," giving ample reason to enlarge
the one-year/three-year rule propounded by the Supreme Court.34
Notwithstanding those facts, the Senator was evenhanded in his
approach, and addressed the concerns of potential defendants in this
way:
Of course, the securities industry needs to be protected as well. An unlimited
time limit for filing section 10 suits would expose securities firms to unreason-
able and unpredictable liabilities. The legislation I am introducing today rec-
ognizes the concerns of both the securities industry and the individual
investors.3 5 5
Senator Bryan contended that left unchecked, the Lampf decision
will force the termination of "a great number of legitimate cases"
350. Id.
351. S. 1533, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (July 23, 1991). Senator Bryan has also offered
up the substance of S. 1533 as an amendment to the Senate Banking Committee's com-
prehensive banking reform bill, and a House of Representatives counterpart to the
Bryan measure was introduced by Representative Markey, chair of the Subcommittee
on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Com-
merce. Senate Bank Reform Bill Would Revise Decision On § 10(b) Limitations Pe-
riod, 23 FED. SEC. & CORPORATE DEVELOPMENTS 1291 (August 30, 1991). Indeed, the
Markey proposal goes even further, allowing plaintiffs "to bring suits within either
five years of the alleged violation or three years from the time the alleged violation
was discovered." Id.
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filed in good faith because of the impossible standards of time now
imposed by the high Court, and declared that the decision's short-
comings compelled "a great deal of urgency."3 56 In closing, the Sena-
tor stated that the unprecedented level of activity in the stock
markets in the last decade "provided equally unprecedented opportu-
nities for securities fraud."357 While acknowledging that the excesses
of the profligate Eighties are now largely behind us, nevertheless
"there will always be something new on the horizon .... We have a
responsibility to ensure that investors have enough time to seek legal
redress."358
Indeed, the SEC's support for the Bryan bill has had significant
political repercussions. It was reported that no less than Vice Presi-
dent Dan Quayle requested that Chairman Breeden review his testi-
mony in support of the measure, as the proposal to expand the
limitary period "is being opposed by a powerful coalition of account-
ants, lawyers and Wall Street firms."359 Nevertheless, in his testi-
mony "Mr. Breeden strongly endorsed the measure, saying that
lawsuits brought by individuals, and not his agency, 'performed a crit-
ical role in preserving the integrity of our securities market.' "360
The SEC head pointed out that "uncovering sophisticated securities
fraud was difficult and time-consuming," and, had the Lampf rule
been in effect at the time, "about 'one-half of the case against Drexel
Burnham, a large part of the Equity Funding case and all of the case
against E.F. Hutton for check-kiting would have been barred.' "361
Chairman Breeden added that the present one-year/three-year limi-
tary period could threaten shareholder suits against the Bank of
Commerce and Credit International and Salomon Brothers in those
respective scandals.362 Notably, it was separately reported that both
Executive Life of California, the seized insurer, and imprisoned junk
bond king Michael Milken have begun to seek dismissals in their in-
dividual cases based upon the Supreme Court's holding in Lampf.
356. Id
357. Id.
358. Id. Senator Riegle, the Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, commented
that "the individual investor is the key to the strength and liquidity of our securities
markets." Id at 1.0692 (remarks of Senator Riegle). The proposed bill would protect
such parties by granting them sufficient time in which to assemble a case to fight any
stock fraud, thereby ensuring "that the securities markets are accessible and fair." Id.





Moreover, Chairman Breeden's comments at public forums demon-
strate his continued strong support for a statutory two-year/five-year
limitary period.363
Senator Bryan's proposal could very well be the precise remedy
that the federal securities laws need in the wake of Lampf. While
unmistakably a good thing overall, the harmful side effects of Lampf,
as well as the apparent retroactive applications of the Court's deci-
sion, are still doing damage to the system. As previously exposited in
detail, this apparent retroactivity has had serious ramifications, ones
not necessarily helpful to the proper functioning of the regulatory
scheme. Moreover, it would be gratifying if Congress were to exer-
cise its will, if it thinks the somewhat restrictive one-year/three-year
parameter now in place should be expanded, in order to better ac-
commodate the necessities of securities antifraud litigation.
In sum, legislative intervention on this issue is as necessary as it is
welcome at this time. While the pending bill discussed above may
not be the one ultimately enacted into law, it does represent a very
positive step in the right direction. From this perspective, such reme-
dial lawmaking by Congress is the very tonic needed to restore the
balance and fairness that the uniform limitary rule seeks above all
else.
CONCLUSION
From the time the courts first implied a private cause of action
arising from section 10(b), the antifraud provision of the federal se-
curities law, the application of that statute has suffered from the lack
of a legislatively enacted statute of limitations.
Judges endeavored to fill that critical gap by applying the long-
standing doctrine of "borrowing" the limitary periods of the forum
for federal actions lacking a statute of repose. However, the disunity
resulting from the borrowing of divergent state limitation periods
only served to complicate matters.
In recent years, the modifications made by the Supreme Court to
the principles of state borrowing have encouraged certain appellate
courts to instead look within the federal securities regulations for a
closely analogous statute of repose for uniform application to section
10(b). The Third Circuit was the first to borrow a one-year-from-dis-
covery/three-years-from-the-act limitary span from elsewhere in the
securities codification. Followed by the Seventh Circuit, and capped
by the same holding from the pre-eminent Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, the uniform one-year/three-year rule gained the ap-
363. Breeden Urges Changes to Limit Baseless Securities Allegations, 23 SEC. REG.
& LAW REP. 1524 (BNA) (October 18, 1991) (reiterating support for S. 1533 in a speech
delivered before the Corporate Counsel Institute on October 16, 1991).
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proval of these tribunals, winning out over, inter alia, the five-year
statute of limitations for insider trading prosecutions and the new
general federal four-year limitary period.
In Lampf the Supreme Court has finally promulgated a uniform
limitary period for securities antifraud litigation, adopting the one-
year/three-year rule popularized by the progressive circuits. The
consistency granted by this decision is, of course, welcomed. How-
ever, the plurality decision was gravely questioned by the dissenting
Justices, who thought the one-and-three span inadequate for the sin-
gularly vital purposes of the antifraud statute.
This article respectfully joins the critics of the Court's selection,
and proposes remedial legislation to enact a two-years-from discov-
ery/four-years-from-the violation statute of limitation for section
10(b). This best serves both the interests of the injured investor as
plaintiff and the concerns of the business community subject to the
risks of litigation. In any event, Lampf has, at the least, finally
achieved the uniformity long sought after by the courts compelled
into interstitial lawmaking.
Nevertheless, a serious problem remains in the application of
Lampf. Given this wholly new precedent, the Supreme Court dogma
tells us such innovations demand prospective application only. Yet
Lampf apparently imposes itself retroactively, and a companion hold-
ing by the high Court raises the specter of unexpected retroactivity.
Truly, this is counter to the prior teachings of the Supreme Court,
and has been soundly criticized by the dissenters in both of the high
Court's recent cases. To be sure, the courts below have been inclined
to be only forward-looking for the new rule.
The problem is indeed a serious one, as a retroactive application of
Lampf would condemn to death numerous actions filed in a good
faith reliance upon then-existing precedent. It is suggested here that
a retroactive application of the new one-year/three-year rule would
be an egregious error, inflicting an injustice and hardship that the
majority of the Justices would no doubt oppose. For that reason, pro-
spective application only of Lampf is urged herein.
Lastly, the outcry against Lampf, on both the propriety of its cho-
sen time period and the retroactivity issue, has reached the halls of
Congress. Legislation is now pending to expand the limitary period
and decree only prospective application for the new uniform rule.
Putting aside a mild disagreement with the legislators' choice of an
appropriate timeframe, this article favors such a remedial enactment,
not merely because it resolves the foregoing defects found in Lampf,
but it represents a proper exercise of the lawmaking function by the
persons elected to do so. The onus of judge-made law is thereby
eradicated from this critical area.
It is an old saying that where there is light, there is also shadow.
The Supreme Court has lit the Lampf, so to speak, and shone the
brightness of a uniform limitation for section 10(b) actions where the
dark confusion of borrowing from state law once reigned. Yet the
light inevitably brings with it the countervailing darkness, here pri-
marily in the form of the apparent retroactive application of the one-
year/three-year rule, as well as the gray question of whether the one-
year/three-year rule is indeed the best span for determining an-
tifraud actions. While the shadows can never be completely elimi-
nated, this article urges the courts and the lawmakers to minimize
the blackness by applying the new rule only prospectively, and by
widening the limitations period to a two-year/four-year span. In clos-
ing, let Lampf shine forever bright, and let plaintiffs and defendants
alike in section 10(b) actions enjoy its benefits, while avoiding its
shadows.
AUTHOR's NOTE
As this article went to print, President Bush signed into law the
1991 banking reform bill, which, inter alia, eradicated the retroactive
effect of Lampf. S. 543, the Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Re-
form and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991, was signed by the chief
executive on December 19, 1991, and evinced the will of Congress to
undo the damage already done by the retroactive application of the
new uniform statute of limitations to securities fraud actions.
Amendments to the 1934 Act restore the applicable limitary periods
to actions that commenced pre-Lampf, and permit plaintiffs to rein-
state any antifraud actions dismissed subsequent to Lampf by reason
of the new rule. Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 101, - Stat. -, at § 476
(1991). Indeed, the legislative reform confirms the propriety of the
portion of this analysis calling for prospective application only for
Lampf, and, as advocated here, harkens the beginning of fresh debate
over any appropriate modification of the new one-year/three-year
limitary period.
